

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

January-
March 1999

PB 34-89-1

J Name: Military Intelligence
J Code: FMIT -PA JCode-
Edition:
Dept: PA PQR: Yes
Pub Date: Jan-Mar 1999
NumDate: 990100 DateRcvd: 5/4/99
Supplmnt:
Volume: 25 Issue: 1
Part: Sect:
Workgrp: BPO: No
ABI-AFT: PA-AFT: Yes GPO: Yes
Path: IRR-PA
Shared:
Source: Publisher -
Editor:

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| ABI | PA |
| 5/18-22-5/18 | |

QCer:

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ABI Beg Number:

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ABI End Number:

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Catalog Number: 12116.01
PC Page Count:

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Intelligence in Joint and Combined Operations

FROM THE EDITOR

As the new editor for the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, I wish to thank CW3 Deborah English for easing my transition. I also wish to thank my associate editor, Elizabeth McGovern, for providing the continuity that keeps *MIPB* the professional work that it is. Part of preserving and improving any profession is the cultivation and sharing of professional expertise. It is my purpose to ensure that *MIPB* is the definitive professional journal for our vocation.

This issue of *MIPB* explores intelligence in joint and combined operations. Nearly every operation the United States military embarks upon is one requiring cooperation among the Services—and often among allied nations as well. Because accurate information is essential to any operation, it is imperative that intelligence among the Services be collected, analyzed, and disseminated among all our Services. Many future intelligence operations will join Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force systems and analysts. Furthermore, we will incorporate resources from many non-military agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Drug Enforcement Agency to produce comprehensive intelligence. The need to share intelligence among our allied partners shows that we must expand our understanding of other nations' intelligence operations.

The articles in this issue further that understanding. It contains several articles analyzing joint intelligence operations in peacekeeping missions and contingency operations. These include a delineation of joint intelligence planning imperatives by Colonel Allen Boyd (USA, Ret.), Major Tim Faulkner's recommendations on joint collection focus development, Captain Vince Torres' article on joint collection management, and Chief Warrant Officer Three Scott Maxner's recommendations on terrain analysis support to joint operations. Additionally, there are several articles describing intelligence operations with allied and coalition partners. Colonels Bill Moore and Kenneth Boll elucidate intelligence support to Coalition Task Force-Kuwait and Captain Robert Goodson describes work on a combined staff in Korea. Major Harry Jones' article on intelligence in Marine Corps maritime operations furthers our knowledge of working with other Services.

In our April-June 1999 issue of *MIPB*, our theme will be "Intelligence in the total force: leveraging the Reserves and National Guard." Look for articles describing how the Reserve and Active Components are working more closely together than ever and how the components can better meld to produce timely, quality intelligence.

I encourage you to submit articles on the following topics for possible publication in the next year:

- Noncommissioned officer topics such as training, development, roles, leadership, and NCOs' duties.
- Intelligence analysis: strategic-level, theater-level, tactical-level, unconventional warfare scenarios, technical analysis, etc.

I encourage submission of all articles contributing expertise on any MI topic. Also, do not hesitate to send letters to the editor or short instructional articles for our "Quick Tips" department. This is our Corps' professional forum—submit a provocative article, propose a radical change, defend a tough position, challenge the status quo. MI will be better because you did.

Writer of the Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce that Colonels William R. Moore and Kenneth H. Boll, Jr., are our January-March 1999 **Writers of the Quarter** for their article, "Intelligence for the Coalition: The Story of Support to Coalition Task Force-Kuwait." Congratulations to them, and many thanks to all our authors for their great articles. Contributions like yours make *MIPB* the forum for MI professionals.

How to Submit an Article

MIPB is always seeking good articles on a variety of topics as well as action photographs of MI soldiers. Please see page 56 for some suggested topics and instructions on how to submit your article or pictures.

Military Intelligence

PB 34-99-1
Volume 25 Number 1
January-March 1999

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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* quarterly under provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB disseminates material designed to enhance individuals' knowledge of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional developments in the MI Corps.

Submissions: Please send your manuscripts, letters to the editor, photographs, and any inquiries to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E-mail to: mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and an information copy to mcgovern@huachuca-emh1.army.mil, or telephone (520) 538-1006/5 or DSN 879-1006/5.

Subscriptions: Subscription rates are \$7.50 per year (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and \$9.40 per year (Foreign). Send changes of address and subscriptions (see page 15) to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. **Keep us informed of your changes of address!** For further information, phone (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015 or E-mail: martinez@c@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

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
FEATURES

- 4 **Intelligence for the Coalition:**
The Story of Support to Coalition Task Force-Kuwait
by Colonel William R. Moore and
Colonel Kenneth H. Boll, Jr.
- 7 **Working on a Combined Staff in the Republic of Korea**
by Captain Robert E. Goodson, Jr.
- 10 **Joint Intelligence in Support of Peace operations**
by Colonel H. Allen Boyd (USA, Retired)
- 16 **CI and HUMINT in Multinational Operations:**
The Lessons of Vigilant Blade 97
by Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Pick, USA
Major Kevin S. Rentner, USA and Major Robert J. Dukat, USAF
- 21 **Ground Surveillance Operations In Bosnia**
by Staff Sergeant Timothy D. Tolison
- 23 **Collection Focus Development in Peacekeeping Operations**
by Major Timothy L. Faulkner
- 26 **Lessons Learned from a Unified Endeavor Collection Manager**
by Captain Vincent H. Torres
- 29 **Terrain Support to Joint IPB: A Unified Endeavor Experience**
by Chief Warrant Officer Three Scott J. Maxner
- 33 **Closing the Intelligence Gap in the OMFTS Concept**
by Major Harry E. Jones, II
- 36 **The Precision SIGINT Targeting System**
by Lieutenant Commander Michael V. Cooperwood (USN)
and Major John F. Petrik (USAR)
- 40 **The Aerial Exploitation Battalion at NTC:**
Aerial Intelligence Defines the Battlefield
by Captain Guy M. Burrow

DEPARTMENTS

| | | | |
|----|---------------------|----|-----------------|
| 2 | Vantage Point | 50 | TSM Notes |
| 3 | CSM Forum | 53 | Quick Tips |
| 45 | Letters | 54 | Proponent Notes |
| 45 | Professional Reader | 55 | Sly Fox |
| 47 | Concepts & Doctrine | 57 | Unit Profile |

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official



JOEL B. HUDSON
Acting Administrative Assistant
to the secretary of the Army

DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

VANTAGE POINT

As we begin the last year of the 20th century, the Military Intelligence Corps is ready to move with the rest of the Army into Army XXI—an Army ready for the challenges of the information age. The MI Corps has tremendous opportunities to innovate as we provide critical intelligence supporting our commanders and policy-makers. The dawn of the information age together with our readiness to fight and win our nation's wars, respond to contingencies, and shape the world environment, present a real challenge to our Corps. There are three areas that I think every leader must focus on for the MI Corps to be successful: teamwork, unit training, and attracting and retaining quality soldiers and leaders.

Intelligence is a team sport in many ways. Today's Army requires that we nurture and develop that teamwork. We should develop approaches and procedures that best use the talents of all our personnel. We must develop a strong partnership between the Active and Reserve Components; about 30 percent of our Corps is in the Army Reserve and National Guard. Today's Army cannot rely on the Active Component alone—we must develop a seamless MI force. Seek opportunities to develop partnerships, understand the strengths and challenges of each component, and endeavor to integrate training and missions. We should have the same relationships with our civilians and contractors. It is essential for us to make good use of these resources and put together the best possible team to support the commander.

I do not need to tell you that we are busy. The deployment tempo is high and intelligence is a complicated business. We need to reemphasize training, especially small unit training, within the MI Corps. Time is our most precious commodity and often, in the press of other requirements, training falls out. Recently, the senior leadership of the Army met with the Chief of Staff to discuss training; in attendance were senior leaders (commissioned and noncommissioned officers) from all echelons, active and reserve. One common theme emerged—we must get back to basics. The Army training doctrine contained in **FMs 25-100 (Training the Force)** and **25-101 (Battle Focused Training)** is sound, and well-developed techniques such as the eight-step training model work. Senior leaders need to properly resource and protect training, but junior leaders executing quality training based on proven doctrine make the difference. I encourage all of you to talk about how to organize and



U.S. Army photo.

Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

conduct training. Dust off the field manuals and get back to basics.

We cannot execute the mission if we do not have the soldiers and leaders. The MI Corps is presently at 87-percent strength. We have significant shortages in many critical military occupational specialties such as 96B (Intelligence Analyst) and 98G (Voice Interceptor). Our recruiting and retention are not keeping up with our requirements. We all must confront this serious issue, and there are several initiatives in place to help solve this problem. We have addressed selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs), we are working hard to reduce attrition, and we are increasing our training capacity. The MI Corps has increased the number of MI soldiers assigned to the Recruiting Command. The senior leadership of the Department of the Army is urging pay and retirement increases. I ask each of you to help. Support recruiting; put great soldiers back into their communities as MI advocates, work with local schools and recruiters, and support all opportunities to showcase MI to the local communities. Perhaps most importantly, ensure that you are

creating an environment in which we show that we value soldiers and civilians for their contributions and support them through a caring, engaged chain of command. If we work together, we will attract and retain America's best.

You accomplish challenging missions every day and I am proud of you. I am convinced that if we focus on these three basics: teamwork, training, and retaining quality, we will be well positioned for the 21st century. Thanks for all that you do and remain—

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

CSM FORUM

On March 1 through 5, the 1999 CSM/SGM MI WorldWide Conference met and from all accounts, was a huge success. Approximately 140 MI Sergeants Major and Command Sergeants Major came together at Fort Huachuca to work some hard issues and make recommendations for solutions. I would like to thank all those who worked so hard to make this year's conference such a success, and all those Sergeants Major who traveled so far and accomplished so much in such a short period of time. The slides from the conference will be E-mailed to the attendees and will be available on the Sergeants Major Bulletin Board.

Please start thinking about next year's conference—briefings you would like to see and issues that the conference will need to address. Do not forget to register for the Sergeants Major Bulletin Board—your registration will feed the WorldWide Address Book. Again, thanks for a great conference.

CSM Doug Russell (USA, Retired) continues to amaze me, both in stamina and in his contributions to our Military Intelligence Corps. During this year's conference, he offered, and pending Secretary of the Army approval we have accepted, a substantial contribution to start and perpetuate an annual award to recognize outstanding MI Soldiers. The MI Corps will name this award after its benefactor and we are in the process of working out all of the details, selection criteria, presentation, etc., and would like your input. You can E-mail me directly at chunns@huachuca-ern1.army.mil if you have any ideas or feedback.

On a sad note, CSM Chet Leeth recently passed away. Chet was a good friend and a great CSM. We will miss him terribly. Please take a moment to think of him and to remember his family in your prayers.



Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

The MI students of Class 49 at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy are still looking for any MI memorabilia for the MI Room at the Academy. I was at the Academy two weeks ago and the MI room is pretty austere, but they are making some headway. If you have something that might be of interest or MI-related, please contact me at the above E-mail address and I will arrange to get it to them.

As always, train hard, take care of soldiers and their families, and have fun. Thanks!

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!



Intelligence for the Coalition: The Story of Support to Coalition Task Force-Kuwait

by Colonel William R. Moore
and Colonel Kenneth H. Boll, Jr.

During February 1998, Iraq's continued defiance of international sanctions, resulting from its unsuccessful aggression against Kuwait, caused the allies to establish Coalition Task Force-Kuwait (CTF-K). It was part of Operation DESERT THUNDER with the mission to deter further aggression against Kuwait. Commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas R. Franks, CTF-K was a multi-Service, multinational force, large enough to actually defend Kuwait and configured to expand for increased military roles in the region.

CTF-K intelligence operations during Operation DESERT THUNDER consistently supported the commander with timely and accurate intelligence at the operational and tactical levels. The intelligence architecture for collection and dissemination provided the foundation for a continuing capability for CTF-K and, in a very short time, set a new standard for intelligence organizations in theater.

With the help of national and theater agencies, a multidiscipline intelligence center coordinated the counterintelligence and other intelligence disciplines within CTF-K's Joint Intelligence Support

Element (JISE). U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) supported the JISE and the Coalition Operations and Intelligence Center (COIC) with a Joint Command Augmentation Cell. They provided joint multidiscipline intelligence experts in operational-level issues to assist CENTCOM in establishing the Coalition/Joint intelligence operations C/J2 section, and facilitated the rapid transition. The C/J2 had staff augmentation in the following areas: plans, operations, foreign disclosure, collection management, and current intelligence. As a whole, the CTF-K intelligence staff coordinated an impressive array of intelligence organizations.




Figure 1. CTF-K Organization.




Figure 2. CFT-K Intelligence Staffs.

Forward presence was perhaps the single greatest intelligence force multiplier. With the intelligence systems architecture in place in Kuwait, and experienced intelligence liaison officers already assigned, existing procedures easily expanded to accommodate the demands of a Coalition headquarters.

The agency of the Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (TFCICA), appointed by CENTCOM, coordinated counterintelligence (CI). Supported by CENTCOM's Joint Rear Area Coordination staff in theater, the TFCICA quickly identified and organized more than 80 tactical CI personnel from 3 separate Services within the CTF-K joint operational area. The TFCICA coordinated CI support, force protection guidance, and multidiscipline CI protection for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized). Weekly JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System) video-conferences with terrorism experts from the national intelligence agencies and CENTCOM helped the TFCICA ensure superb force protection, threat visualization, and accurate assessments for commanders at all levels of the CTF-K.

The JISE-coordinated signals intelligence (SIGINT) was vital for CTF-K operations and analysis. Likewise, the imagery intelligence (IMINT) area showed great growth and improvement in the Coalition intelligence arena since DESERT STORM. Within days of alert, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) furnished a support package of personnel and equipment that revolutionized in-theater support for the planning process; their support lent a new dimension to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for the



A Bradley infantry fighting vehicle offloads in Kuwait.

joint and combined operational planning group. Ably assisted by a detachment of the 100th Engineer Company (Topographic), the NIMA team established a Terrain Center of Excellence. Bound together by the latest automated data processing equipment and powerful dissemination networks, the IMINT capability for the CTF-K matured into an unparalleled in-theater support structure for the maneuver commander.

A strong measurement and signals intelligence (MASINT) presence supported CTF-K—with Medium Ground Station Module (MGSM) teams from the 513th MI Force Projection Brigade providing Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) downlinks to the deep operations coordination centers at both the land component command headquarters (formed by the Marine Division's tactical command post) and at the COIC. In addition to the MGSMs, a stand-alone Joint STARS workstation deployed and tested at the CTF headquarters, with great success. Joint STARS was one successful piece of an

overall superb targeting effort of the CTF-K during a one-week deep operations center coordination exercise, as well as during a Coalition command post exercise.

CENTCOM support in the technical area of foreign disclosure was another success story. Early deployment of a functional area expert from the CENTCOM unified command staff eased the way for a frank intelligence exchange among all the Coalition partners. A trailblazing foreign disclosure standing operating procedure (SOP) has been incorporated into the CTF-K command and control process. Common sense and cooperation are standard in the CTF-K intelligence system.

Coalition intelligence exchange regarding the Iraqi threat was perhaps the single greatest intelligence success story of DESERT THUNDER. The Kuwaiti Defense staff was particularly supportive of CTF-K intelligence requests for information (RFIs). The CTF-K reciprocated by providing tactical intelligence information to all the

(Continued on page 52)

Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense.

Working on a Combined Staff in the Republic of Korea

by Captain
Robert E. Goodson, Jr.

Anyone who has ever worked in a joint command knows the difficulties and language barriers that can come from working in a multi-Service organization. From different operational terms to evaluation reports, a joint environment can present many obstacles that we must overcome if the organization is to be successful. In the same sense, this environment provides a great learning opportunity and professional experience. From participating in the other Services' traditions to seeing things done in a different and perhaps even better way, a joint duty assignment can be a great and rewarding experience.

Now, take that experience and factor in not just a difference in "lingo" but a different language. Add the fact that you are not only dealing with another language but also another culture. Finally, factor in the security issues presented by a combined intelligence effort and you can begin to imagine the unique challenges of working in a combined environment, specifically the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Just as with a joint assignment, a combined assignment can be a positive professional and personal experience.

CFC and USFK

United States Forces, Korea (USFK) is a sub-unified command within the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and represents the majority of the U. S. military presence in the ROK. In addition to U.S. personnel assigned solely to the CFC, many members of USFK fill both combined and joint duty positions and represent the U.S. military within the CFC. CFC is composed of elements of all the military Services of the ROK and the United States. South Korean and U.S. military personnel work together in the CFC and USFK to deter any threat from North Korea.

Given the mission of the CFC, it is obvious that intelligence plays a vital factor in the accomplishment of this mission. The task of providing intelligence to the CFC forces falls upon the intelligence staff element or the Assistant Chief of Staff, C2 (Intelligence Directorate). The head of the C2 is currently a ROK Air Force major general. The USFK Assistant Chief of Staff, J2—the senior U.S. intelligence officer on the Korean peninsula (presently an Army brigadier general)—serves as his deputy. Within the C2, U.S. and ROK intelligence personnel (both military and civilian) work cooperatively to provide the CFC with accurate and predictive intelligence in support of the armistice¹ and, if necessary, wartime mission.

ROK intelligence personnel provide a much-needed continuity for U.S. intelligence soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Due to the high personnel tempo in Korea², there is a nearly constant rotation of U.S. soldiers and civilians in and out of the theater. As they leave, so does their knowledge of the North Korean threat. Additionally, North Korea is arguably the toughest intelligence target in the world. It is an extremely closed society, and their emphasis on operational security (OPSEC) makes analyzing their order of battle (OB) and threat challenging for any intelligence professional, especially one who spends only one or two years in Korea. Obviously, the South Koreans' experience and knowledge in dealing with the North Korean threat are invaluable for U.S. personnel. U.S. civilian intelligence analysts also provide a crucial continuity in the theater. It is vital that military personnel take advantage of these resources.

Combined for a Reason

ROK expertise is crucial when conducting intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). U.S. theater-level analysts cannot feasibly conduct a ground reconnaissance of the entire theater. ROK personnel can provide essential information on the effects of the terrain on friendly and enemy operations. Because of the type of terrain on the Korean peninsula,

mechanized mobility corridors and avenues of approach equate to major lines of communication (LOCs); most South Koreans have traveled these LOCs and can discuss trafficability and weather effects. In addition, South Korea's highways are improved or built faster than new maps are printed: ROK personnel can provide these updates to your map reconnaissance.

Due to North Korea's large special purpose forces³, rear area IPB is also critical. Our South Korean counterparts can provide valuable information on likely threat targets. In addition, the South Korean field armies and corps have intelligence personnel conducting detailed analysis of their area of operations (AO) and concentrating on the specific threat to that AO. There are ROK intelligence analysts that study the same North Korean units day in and day out, and have done so for years. A ROK analyst would likely notice immediately ambiguous indicators that might not stand out to an U.S. analyst who has not been able to follow the historical development and traditional training patterns of a particular unit. In addition, a ROK analyst's attention to detail results in very detailed North Korean OB.

Combined Challenges

At times, U.S. personnel fail to make our South Korean counterparts an integral part of our intelligence effort. I believe that there are several reasons for this: the language barrier, an ignorance of Korean culture, and security practices.

The **language barrier** can be frustrating and can lead one to the easy way out: do not include the ROK personnel. Our Korean allies can misconstrue this language barrier as not understanding a concept. We, at times, tend to become very impatient and show our frustration by raising our voices. To our Korean counterparts, this behavior

can be quite offensive and can inadvertently create another obstacle to communication. Unfortunately, this does a huge disservice to the combat commander who needs the best intelligence available. The best intelligence is, in almost every case, combined intelligence.

Ironically, we worsen the language issue by using phrases and terms that a native English speaker, let alone a Korean, cannot understand, and using acronyms that we ourselves do not know or which we have forgotten. In preparing dual-language briefings, I have often learned as much as the Koreans did, because I researched U.S. terms in order to explain them in understandable



terms to my counterpart. The incidental benefit to this is that U.S. intelligence personnel must speak or write in easily translatable and, therefore, easily understood terms. If you can explain it to Korean personnel, you can also explain it to an operator or combat soldier, who may be just as unfamiliar with "MI speak."

We prepare numerous dual language briefings in the C2 for presentation side-by-side to a combined audience. Something as small as a different size of a bullet on a graphic or something more substantive (e.g., the North's quantity of a particular system), can cause much consternation and embarrassment for our South Korean counterparts and us. Again,

we often add to this problem by making complex, multicolored animated presentations that are not easily translatable or understandable to either audience. It is critical that you coordinate every change to a document or briefing with your counterpart to ensure it is still understandable.

A misunderstanding or lack of knowledge about **Korean culture** and traditions can also present an obstacle for combined intelligence. To someone ignorant of Korean culture, a Korean may seem unprofessional or uninterested at times. Social interchange is very important to Koreans. There are times when you may be very busy and a South Korean counterpart wants to "shoot the breeze" for a few minutes; although it may seem like what you are doing just cannot wait, take a few minutes and socialize. Koreans are generally very circumspect in public, so take the opportunity when it arises to get to know them. Socializing is quite acceptable in the Korean workplace; the South Koreans, in addition to our regular five-day workweek, also work Saturday mornings. Most South Koreans are amazed at the number of Federal and training holidays that U.S. personnel have.

Rapport and mutual respect will pay big dividends in your professional relationships. Spend any amount of time with a Korean and you should immediately recognize that they are consummate professionals, very detail-oriented, and dedicated to the defense of their nation. Koreans take very personally day-to-day failures or shortcomings which are fairly acceptable and commonplace to us. Knowledge of this cultural trait is extremely important in U.S.-ROK relations.

It helps to understand that Confucianism provides the basis of Korean culture and traditions. This means that there is an automatic

hierarchical relationship established between two people. This is a concept embedded very deeply in all aspects of Korean society and is most apparent in their language, which has varying levels of polite words and uses of subordinate-to-senior expressions. This is easy for us to translate into a military community; however, in Korean society, it also includes age, occupation, gender, marital status, and even which college one had attended.

Many Koreans will ask questions that to U.S. soldiers and civilians may seem very personal. Far from being rude, it is a method of establishing the hierarchical relationship. When U.S. personnel joke with superiors it is generally acceptable, within reason. However, a Korean superior can construe the jokes of a U.S. subordinate as very rude behavior.

Finally, some U.S. intelligence personnel become frustrated when their ROK counterparts cannot share all of their information due to **security constraints**. The ROK military is very security conscious in dealing with ROK-produced classified information and employs very stringent measures in handling classified or sensitive documents. There is a well-documented North Korean human intelligence (HUMINT) effort; thus, OPSEC is very important and pragmatic for the South Korean military. Remember that we also do not share everything with our allies.

Rewards

In addition to the professional development gained from serving on a combined staff, there are other rewards, both personal and professional, that one can only experience by serving in another country. As I mentioned earlier, Korean society is somewhat closed compared to Western cultures. However, earn the respect of Koreans or show a genuine interest in their lives, and they will treat you

very graciously. I believe there is much we can achieve, as soldiers and foreign visitors, from befriending Koreans.

Another enjoyable aspect of being on a combined staff, particularly South Korean, is their enjoyment of things that have become trivial to the U.S. military. Receiving praise or recognition is a big deal for Koreans. Being in the U.S. Army, where awards have become devalued and commonplace (aside from awards for valor or bravery), it is refreshing to see the importance placed on an award and its presentation in the South Korean military. Even if it is a certificate of achievement, you can be sure that the presenter will have some refreshments available after the presentation. The superior will take some time to socialize with and express genuine appreciation for the awardee.

Conclusion

Single-Service operations are now rare for the U.S. military, and joint assignments have become a critical part of a military member's professional development. One need only watch the news to understand that it is also less likely that the United States will participate in any unilateral operations. Combined experience is a very crucial and rewarding part of a military career.

Taking the time to learn about another nation's culture and ways

of doing business will pay huge dividends. It will also make the combined duty assignment or combined exercise more productive. Especially for intelligence professionals, I believe it will provide you with different and, perhaps, better ways of doing our business.

The author would like to thank Captain Anne Weinberg, U.S. Marine Corps, for her assistance in addressing Korean culture. Captain Weinberg is an East Asian Foreign Area Officer, and has studied in the Republic of Korea.

Endnotes

1. Following the Korean War, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea signed an armistice in July 1953; to date they have not signed a peace treaty.
2. Military personnel stationed in South Korea generally serve a two-year accompanied tour or a one-year unaccompanied tour.
3. North Korea has the largest special operations force in the world.

Captain Goodson is currently serving as a Strategic Intelligence Officer in the Estimates Branch, Plans and Operations Division, Combined Forces Command C2/USFK J2. His previous assignments include Assistant S2 and S2 of 5th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division; Collection and Jamming Platoon Leader, A Company, 101st Military Intelligence Battalion, 1st Infantry Division; and S2, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Bn, 1st Infantry Division. CPT Goodson graduated from Virginia Institute of Technology with a Bachelor of Arts degree in German and Political Science. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at goodsonr@usfk.korea.army.mil and telephonically at DSN (315)723-6423.

Attention NCOs

Send us your articles and book reviews. If you have experience you can share on MI doctrine, professional development, or "how-to" tips, please send them to **Military Intelligence**. Topics of interest for future issues include:

- Counterintelligence and human intelligence
- Analysis
- MI skills training

E-mail them to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or call (520) 538-1005/6 or DSN 879-1005/6.



Joint Intelligence in Support of Peace Operations

by Colonel H. Allen Boyd (USA, Retired)

In recent years, the U.S. joint military intelligence (MI) community has made substantial advances toward assembling a more responsive and cohesive intelligence support system for the operational commander. Common systems and increasingly joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) continue to mitigate individual Service parochialism and its "stovepipes." Spearheaded by a technology revolution, these efforts are applying the lessons of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to an objective joint MI system that can quickly focus on a threat situation and provide the joint force commander with sufficient battlespace awareness to win a decisive military victory. However, it remains a system primarily focused on conventional

scenarios where the military tasks are clear, the threat is homogeneous, and technology is the predominant means of resolving ambiguity. It is a system designed for use against an opponent whose intent we know or can readily presume by virtue of its formations and patterns that the high-technology sensors detect.¹

Since Operation DESERT STORM, those situations have been few, as peace operations have dominated the use of U.S. forces. Among the many lessons learned from recent peace operations are that—

- Joint MI support is far more complex in that environment than it is in the realm of the conventional combat operations for which we designed the systems.
- Monitored forces are more ambiguous.

- Military objectives and political and economic agendas are all interwoven; the synchronization of which has proven to be enormously difficult.
- Belligerents' intentions are volatile, reflected in part by the positioning and activity of military and paramilitary forces, but rarely defined by them.
- Successful intelligence depends not as much on the application of high-technology means to locate and assess targets but rather more on the balancing and application of all collection means (some very simplistic).

In all peace operations from Somalia to the Balkans, joint intelligence efforts have required major modifications to the offensive- and target-oriented model validated in part by Operation DESERT STORM.

There are more clearly defined and practical intelligence planning principles and realities for peace operations than those currently found in operational doctrine; future peace-operations commanders will not be able ignore them

While peace operations conducted to date have been very different from one another in purpose and scope, supporting joint intelligence efforts contain a number of commonalities (operational threads), which appear to be lessons that future peace operations commanders should recognize and heed. Joint and individual Service doctrine consists of generic guidance and planning considerations that do not adequately emphasize the differences and complexities of intelligence support to peace operations. Nor does it sufficiently reflect the essential lessons learned over the course of recent operations. There are more clearly defined and practical intelligence planning principles and realities for peace operations than those currently found in operational doctrine; future peace-operations commanders will not be able ignore them

Operational Intelligence Planning Imperatives

From the lessons of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, one can distill four future operations planning imperatives. They are:

- Make intelligence support to force protection the foremost priority.

- Make human intelligence (HUMINT) paramount.
- Apply technology judiciously and surgically.
- Keep the architecture as simple as possible.

Intelligence Support to Force Protection

Given the caution and even reluctance to commit U.S. forces to peace operations and the fragile nature of the peace, operational commanders enter them with a heightened mandate to prevent casualties.

Force protection in peace operations receives more emphasis than combat operations because it directly and immediately affects the force's political and popular support.

As a case in point, the J2 of Atlantic Command's Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 stated that his most critical task during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was to—

develop a level of situational awareness that would prevent friendly casualties from any threats short of accidents...a zero-casualty mission in an environment where the potential for casualties lay inside many Port-au-Prince doorways and alleys.²

What are the implications for the operational commander and intelligence officer given this mandate? First, they must directly allocate intelligence resources to the force protection mission and aggressively employ them. Force protection intelligence must not be a secondary effort or the by-product of intelligence geared to traditional fire- and maneuver-type concerns nor prioritized along close, deep, and rear operational lines.³ Force protection requirements resemble those associated with rear operations in that they are the operations which customarily receive the fewest intelligence resources and less focus. The commander and J2

must immediately reverse that convention in a peace operations mission.

The intelligence collection effort must begin with the headquarters and staging bases of the peace forces and then extend outward along their patrol routes and bases into the zones of separation (ZOS) between belligerents. This requires an increasing commitment of intelligence resources (sensors as well as analysis and dissemination means) until the ZOS area achieves a steady state.

At that point, however, the commander and J2 must devote that level of resource commitment to the force protection mission. Success at this point is a tempting, but dangerous, opportunity to redirect limited, high-demand intelligence resources from secured areas deeper beyond the ZOS.

The joint intelligence system's coverage must form an expanding threat indications and warning "bubble" around the elements of the peace force as they deploy throughout their assigned operating areas and maintain that bubble with vigilance. This grows harder to do as massed brigades and battalions disperse to companies, platoons, and squads at isolated checkpoints and small observation bases where the potential for casualties is highest and where any small incident may easily have significant political consequences.

Successive peace operations commanders and J2s have learned that, while they fully recognized the importance of force protection, they often underestimated the enormous demand it placed on the intelligence systems and support architecture as well as the peace forces themselves. A notable example is the level of effort required to locate and to characterize the millions of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines in Bosnia. As threats, mines are a concern for force protection intelligence, and as such, will occupy the time of

hundreds to thousands of information collectors and dozens of intelligence analysts and reporters.

This requires an enormous investment in resources that must share capabilities and time with others concerned with the belligerents' more visible military and less visible political capabilities and intentions. These resources will very likely need to support an expanded, combined joint MI architecture as well. Another equally important example is the extraordinary time and effort required to develop what then Major Ralph Peters coined "urban intelligence"—information ferreted from the domain of Mogadishu, Port-au-Prince, Tuzla, and Sarajevo.⁴

HUMINT is Paramount

Existing and emerging peace operations doctrine notes the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) to varying degrees, but does not assign to it the overwhelming importance that commanders and J2s continue to learn from one operation to another.⁵ This is perhaps the easiest imperative to understand but possibly the most difficult to implement because it counters technology-based, DESERT STORM-influenced joint operations. Successive peace operations clearly reflect the necessity to establish a full-spectrum HUMINT network throughout the operational area and the reality that poor HUMINT simultaneously risks overall mission failure and protection of the peace force itself. Repeatedly peace operations commanders and J2s have reiterated that HUMINT was their most important intelligence resource.

The purpose here is not to recommend any specific application of a complex intelligence-collection effort but rather to point out directly that several common shortfalls occur in HUMINT support to peace operations. The first is that MI planners, especially during the early planning stages, can

easily equate HUMINT, to the products of the MI organizations capable of producing it (interrogators, counterintelligence (CI) teams, and long-range surveillance units). More than one peace-operations J2 has at least initially planned and organized so-called HUMINT operations in those terms alone. In an era where we commonly equate sensors to systems organic in MI organizations, remember that every individual soldier, sailor, airman, and civilian in the mission area is an information provider and potential HUMINT collector.⁶

CI teams are essentially force protection assets, highly skilled individuals trained to look inward through the lens of an adversary. We train interrogator teams to elicit HUMINT from persons and documents that have come under friendly control but who also introduce some question in terms of credibility and reliability.

Together, CI and interrogator teams do provide critical HUMINT functions, but we can and must complement their limited capabilities with the eyes and ears of non-MI personnel throughout the peace force. Both Somalia and Haiti taught us that lesson, and Bosnia is reiterating it with even greater effect as MI and non-MI personnel alike rediscover the fundamentals of human reconnaissance, surveillance, and liaison.⁷

Peace operations both facilitate and require the broad application and management of human collectors to collect the many fragments of localized, low-level, but often factual information that technology-based sensors can neither find nor process in such highly charged situational dynamics. Infantry soldiers, engineers, civil affairs teams, drivers, aircrew members, special operations teams, medical personnel, and staff members conducting liaison are all valid information collectors. MI must help them see

themselves as such, trained to observe and report, and constantly educated about what information is important within the context of the military and political environment.

The commander must instill this sense of purpose, and the J2 must establish a network in which it can operate. That network would provide a mechanism for disseminating collection requirements to the lowest observer levels and reporting observations upward to the level where a single report may serve as the critically needed information that guides an important military or political decision. It must contain appropriate filters to place informational needs in the proper local context and direct them to the right collectors. It must then similarly ensure the validation of the collected information and its placement in the correct context as it moves upward. The network must have the ability to function in the native language, a reality that we consistently relearn in the face of severely underestimated interpreter requirements.⁸

Technology remains a force multiplier in peace operations, but is more limited than in conventional combat operations

Commanders and J2s must quickly make critical decisions (particularly in the early operational stages) on the placement of reliable, mission-educated interpreters and constantly review these decisions as language capabilities develop and the number of interpreters expands.

This is an enormous effort for which modern commanders and intelligence officers are largely unprepared. It is an effort that requires the re-development of

World War II-vintage reconnaissance, surveillance, and liaison skills; the assembly and understanding of thousands of small pieces of diverse information; and the personal manipulation of a broad, human-based network. This is a network where automation can help organize and collate information—but can rarely interpret its meaning.

Finally, commanders and J2s must recognize that beyond the roles of MI-trained teams, there are HUMINT assets trained to perform the classic role of developing and managing intelligence sources within the belligerent parties. Whether from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), these individuals have critical roles to play in operations where ambiguity abounds. These assets are unlikely to be directly available to the military. Commanders and J2s should, however, make their operational-level HUMINT requirements and the scope and products of their internal HUMINT efforts known through their supporting National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). This coordination enables the tactical, operational, and strategic HUMINT actions to support each other.⁹ This is particularly critical in an environment where HUMINT developed at a low level can have very pronounced operational and strategic impacts.

Judicious Use of Technology

Our high-technology systems include national and theater optical and synthetic aperture radar imagery systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, multimode signals intelligence platforms, and the sophisticated processors and information fusion systems that they feed. Technology remains a force multiplier in peace operations, but is more limited than in conventional combat operations.

The design of technology-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems permits us to map out quickly a conventional, standardized threat for which the visible nature of its formations and orientations leads us to presume its capabilities and intentions. Their use against a small number of mortars or artillery pieces hidden in the debris of Bosnia's urban areas or its rugged terrain is certainly limited.

This is not to say that we should not plan for or use high-technology systems in peace operations. We should use them. They provide a significant advantage when we can closely match their capabilities to specific information requirements.

Imagery can be similarly effective to update or refine information...required for political negotiation and military enforcement

Commanders and J2s must understand how the environment governs their capabilities and limitations. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), for example, proved useful in Bosnia under conditions that limited its application more than we originally expected. Its introduction to the JOINT ENDEAVOR area of operations was accompanied by DESERT STORM-induced prospects for success that were immediately limited by the severity of Bosnian terrain and the radar shadowing it introduces. The Bosnia environment does not have the long convoy lines and massed formations of the Iraqi Republican Guard.

Joint STARS' successes have been in monitoring the evacuation of belligerent forces from the ZOS where formations of equipment

were in assembly areas at known points and time and departed in an organized fashion.¹⁰ Elsewhere the system has been more difficult to apply because of typically small force movements, the inevitable mixing of belligerent military equipment with civilian traffic, the concentration of belligerent's equipment in and around the urban areas, or the simple lack of movement at all.

Imagery systems have proven similarly useful and limited. Imagery can be used with great effect to verify compliance of troop and equipment withdrawals around the ZOS, the integrity of equipment holding areas, and general conditions in areas of interest.¹¹ Imagery in support of peace operations is best applied to surveil areas where some known condition has been established and from which changes can be measured. Where it has proven least successful is in the general search mode where the same limits described above for Joint STARS commonly prevail. Imagery can be similarly effective to update or refine mapping and geodesy information in areas where precision geography is required for political negotiation and military enforcement but is lacking.

High-capacity information processors and analysis tools are limited. This is principally because the bulk of information that MI personnel must analyze (predominantly HUMINT) needs to be put in a non-technical context (characterization of intent) that does not easily lend itself to machine-formatted reports or their terse data fields. By design, the sensor-processor combinations upon which we build joint intelligence architectures and the associated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) will quickly and accurately find visible crucial threat entities and, from those, develop targets.

The intelligence architecture must be robust, flexible, and governed as much as possible by the principles of interoperability and commonality

Those capabilities to acquire, collate, and correlate information should be applicable in peace operations but with the clear understanding that their inherently target-focused processes and products need tempering in a human judgment framework that mechanical systems cannot provide. J2s have consistently discovered that intelligence architectures must be modified (and soldiers trained) to incorporate assessment of both a political and military context with every analysis, adding a very important human dimension to powerful, but limited, technology-based systems.¹²

Simplify the Architecture

The intelligence architecture must be robust, flexible, and governed as much as possible by the principles of interoperability and commonality. However, it is important we understand and plan for several realities. The architecture of the U.S. peace forces will usually dominate those of our allies in terms of capabilities (particularly sophisticated sensors, processors, automated analysis tools, and supporting dissemination systems) and we must share the resulting data with them.¹³ It should be able to accommodate inputs from them, understanding that they can bring intelligence talents, perspectives, and capabilities to complement our own capabilities. This has proved to be particularly true in the HUMINT arena where allies have, in fact, been stronger, better prepared, and more experienced

because their more limited high-technology means often force them to develop compensating HUMINT expertise.

The intelligence architecture must also interact with the information-gathering capabilities of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and private volunteer organizations (PVO). Most are extremely sensitive to the negative connotations of "military intelligence" and are habitually (frequently by charter or politics) reluctant (if not overtly opposed) to being involved with it.¹⁴ They are nevertheless superb sources of facts, impressions, and context if we can respect, accommodate, and protect their politics and policies. Until substantial changes occur, however, commanders must plan early and with great (political) care to interact with allied MI organizations as well as to develop information-sharing relationships with NGOs and PVOs.

The lesson for the future is clear: the more complex and dynamic the peace situation is, the simpler and clearer the supporting intelligence architecture must be.

Similarly, its capacity to accept, process, and effectively deal with HUMINT in general must, in large part, shape the intelligence architecture. The design of the complex information-handling subsystems permits them to deal with facts and things, not the context in which they exist. They conventionally support a "sensor-to-shooter" process that we should avoid altogether or apply very surgically under firm operational and possibly even strategic-level control.

Within such architecture, it is difficult to inject the context of the information in an increasingly automated analytical process that accepts information, applies logical algorithms to it, and then produces an artificial intelligence-based result. We must retain sensor-to-shooter mechanisms, particularly for force protection, but we must retrain them to accept a constant inflow of context-based HUMINT and to operate under careful control.

All of this points to a central need to keep the intelligence architecture as simple and understandable as possible. Our allies cannot trust the U.S. architecture if they cannot understand it. U.S. intelligence liaison teams to allied commands cannot deliver products or submit requirements if our allies cannot understand the mechanisms or if we confuse them with a constantly changing architecture. Most importantly, the system must be clear and simple enabling its U.S. users to know precisely where and how the thousands of informational bits and pieces are processed.

The application of high technology means we must measure the architecture not in quantity but rather in terms of overall simplicity. This was a hard-learned lesson in Somalia where numerous analysis and dissemination problems resulted from an ineffective kluge of intelligence systems and processes.¹⁵ The application of technology had a more positive effect in Haiti, where the architecture centered on a HUMINT effort and technology supported it in a simple but effective manner.¹⁶ We are relearning the lesson now in Bosnia, where the joint MI architecture has a broader array of military and non-military players, and where the complexity of the mission environment is much greater.

Conclusion

The lesson for the future is clear: the more complex and dynamic the

CI and HUMINT in Multinational Operations: The Lessons of Vigilant Blade 97

by Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Pick, USA, Major Kevin S. Rentner, USA, and Major Robert J. Dukat, USAF

As the only exercises of their kind in the world, the Vigilant exercises (conducted since 1995) play a crucial role in the development of doctrine for counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) support to joint task forces (JTFs) and combined or multinational task forces (CTFs). As the largest of the series to date, Vigilant Blade 97 (VB 97) provided important lessons for joint intelligence staffs charged with planning multinational contingency operations. This joint and combined event exercised CI and HUMINT teams and intelligence staff planners of a notional CTF deployed in a military operation other than war (MOOTW).

The combat commanders in MOOTW deal with many coalition partners and host nation authorities, each with distinct national interests. They must coordinate with other government agencies on the U.S. Country Team, which each have their own parochial interests. They must also concern themselves with a broad spectrum of civilians who shape the battlefield: opposition politicians, warlords, civilian demonstrators, refugees, local national employees, U.S. and

foreign media representatives, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and a myriad of actual or potential threats. Human interaction between the military and noncombatants is the dominant motif in MOOTW.

Tackling the unexpected crises and "mission creep" from such a complex environment requires the synchronization of all the tools available to the commander: combat forces, military police, civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOPS), public affairs and information officers, liaison officers, and support personnel. CI and HUMINT play a pivotal role in answering commanders' intelligence requirements.

HUMINT includes both controlled-source acquisition and overt collection, such as interrogations of prisoners of war, debriefings of U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, and official contacts with foreign governments. CI is defined in U.S. joint doctrine as information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments, or foreign organizations or persons, or international terrorists. As a process, CI uses a multidiscipline approach to counter an adversary's all-source intelligence activities and other security threats.

The CI collection function is similar to HUMINT in that it relies on human sources for information. Such sources include liaison sources with law enforcement agencies and foreign intelligence and security services (FISSs), in addition to debriefings and interrogations of persons of CI interest. CI also conducts CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) in support of deployments outside the United States. CFSOs are overt human source collection operations that respond to a commander's force protection-related intelligence requirements.

The United States' experiences in Somalia and other contingency deployments demonstrated that HUMINT and CI collection activities could conflict if they are not thoroughly coordinated. Separate agencies may exploit the same sources, leading to circular reporting which appears to corroborate itself. Both HUMINT and CI could focus their efforts on the same information requirements, leaving gaps in collection against other requirements. Other activities, such as those conducted by special operations forces (SOF), also may result in duplication of effort and misunderstanding. Based on these historical lessons, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the J2X doctrine in **Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to**

Military Operations, to prevent such problems.

A J2X is a CI and HUMINT staff element subordinate to the J2 of a joint task force (JTF). Comprised of a HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC), staffed primarily by the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) and a JTF CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA), the J2X coordinates and deconflicts the JTF's CI and HUMINT activities and other information collection that uses human sources.

Recognizing the need for a similar staff organization to deconflict CI and HUMINT activities in a CTF, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)-sponsored Vigilant exercises pioneered the concept of a C2X, a combined J2X. These exercises alternate each year between Hawaii (the Vigilant Shield exercises) and Australia (the Vigilant Blade exercises). They combine field training for CI and HUMINT personnel with a C2X- focused command post exercise (CPX). The C2X supports a notional CTF, led by the United States for Vigilant Shield, and by Australian for Vigilant Blade.

Vigilant Blade 97 Participants

The U.S. participants (63) came from all corners of the Pacific and from the Washington, D.C., area. The U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (PACOM), Marine Forces Pacific, the 125th MI Battalion, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Field Office Hawaii, and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Detachment 601. The 500th MI Brigade and III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel from Japan and Okinawa; NCIS Field Office Far East personnel; U.S. Army Alaska interrogators; the 201st MI Brigade and the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne); AFOSI and NCIS automation experts; and Defense Intelligence

Agency (DIA) representatives participated in the exercise.

The total number of Australian participants was 105. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) provided CI and HUMINT staff personnel from their headquarters in Canberra, New South Wales (NSW); Australian Theater (HQA) in Potts Point, NSW; and from Land Headquarters (i.e., Australian Army) in Sydney. Other participants included tactical CI and HUMINT from the Australian Army's First Intelligence Company, security police from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), CI officers from the Royal Australian Naval Reserve (RANR), CI personnel from the Directorates of Security of each of the Services, and representatives of the Special Air Services Regiment, Australian national agencies, and the NSW Police.

The British contingent consisted of 15 persons. They represented the Permanent Joint Headquarters, the United Kingdom Army's 2d MI Battalion, Royal Air Force (RAF) Provost and Security Services, and RAF Intelligence.

Training Objectives

The goals of Vigilant Blade 97 were to validate the PACOM CI and HUMINT procedures in a CTF environment, test interoperability with likely contingency partners, and practice CI and HUMINT trade-craft skills. The collective training objectives to support these goals included:

- Establishing and operating a C2X.
- Planning and conducting CI/HUMINT support to a CTF in a MOOTW scenario.
- Providing communications support for CI and HUMINT.
- Deconflicting CI and HUMINT and SOF activities.

Individual and team objectives supported the collective training objectives. These objectives included CI liaison and overt HUMINT

collection, exchange of CI and HUMINT skills, and the conduct of debriefings and interrogations. As with any good training event, controllers identified shortfalls and weaknesses. Vigilant Blade 97 achieved all of these training objectives.

Field Training Exercise and CPX Scenario

In the Vigilant Blade 97 scenario, an Australian-led tri-national CTF deployed to the national country of New South Wales on the continent of Oceania (see Figure 1). The mission of the task force (TF) was to assist the current government to stabilize itself while combating an insurgency. The operations order (OPORD) required the notional forces to combat insurgent elements, deter conventional attack from a hostile border nation, and participate in humanitarian assistance operations to relieve the suffering of refugees.

This scenario provided a myriad of challenges to CI and HUMINT planners and operators. The insurgents represented a separate ethnic minority, which controlled few of the country's political, military, and economic entities. Those it did control were critical to the internal stability of the state, notably the military's counterinsurgency forces. The CTF assumed that all elements of the host nation government had insurgent subversives and sympathizers among their ranks. This included the police, intelligence, and security organizations with which the CI teams conducted liaison. The insurgents received both direct and indirect assistance from a hostile bordering nation with sophisticated multi-discipline intelligence services. Insurgent activities included raids and ambushes, civil disturbances, ethnic clashes, intelligence collection, and terrorism.

Like Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, the scenario has forced CI and HUMINT to contend with the




Figure 1. Combined Task Force Vigilant Blade Organization.

intricacies and parochialisms of the interagency process. Role players represented the U.S. Country Team and Australian embassy officials, including national intelligence agency members, NGOs, tactical commanders and their staffs (including PSYOPS and civil affairs), and the media.

C2X. The central focus of the exercise was the C2X, and its TFCICA and HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) operations. These three entities provided control for CI and HUMINT collection operations within the CTFs. Twenty-five individuals comprised the entire C2X (see Figure 2). An Australian officer was the officer in charge (OIC) of the C2X, a U.S. officer was the TFCICA, and a British officer was the chief of the HOC. Also working in the C2X element, a Special Forces liaison officer deconflicted

SOF CI and HUMINT issues during the C2X.

CI Teams. Each component player team consisted of four to nine personnel, plus a one- or two-member cell serving as the CI and HUMINT staff of each notional component headquarters. Field training for the player teams included CFSO, other collection activities, surveillance, countersurveillance, and CI services in support of their components. In addition to the teams' FTX activities, the component CI staffs also directed activities of several simulated teams for whom the exercise control group scripted the reports.

Lessons Learned

Vigilant Blade 97 taught participants many lessons in the planning, management and conduct of CI and HUMINT in a multinational

contingency operation. Some of the crucial interoperability lessons follow.

C2X. Players from all three nations agreed that if the C2X did not work among these traditional allies, it would not work at all. Though some disagreements existed as to the mechanics of C2X, the exercise validated the crucial aspect of the concept: deconfliction of human-source collection through information sharing and combined CI and HUMINT planning.

One major lesson was the need for an agreed-upon set of C2X procedures before the start of an exercise or actual operation. Though participants at the initial planning conference generally agreed on applying the PACOM tactics, techniques and procedures for joint intelligence operations during the




Figure 2. Vigilante Blade C2X Organization.

exercise, this agreement was never formalized.

Immediately prior to the exercise, some allied participants questioned the applicability of the J2X doctrine to their own forces. These questions resulted in spirited and often esoteric discussions among the senior cadre. These exchanges resolved the issues for the exercise and identified problem areas for future resolution. The two primary points of contention with applying U.S. joint doctrine to combined operations are—command and control (C2) and the distinction made by U.S. forces between CI and HUMINT is not shared by our Allies.

C² is always an emotional issue. Multinational contingents are usually under the tactical control of the CTF commander, but ultimately respond to their national command authorities. In a practical sense, they will most certainly put their national requirements ahead of CTF requirements. Thus, all national components must agree on the

role and authority of the C2X, as well as how to integrate their information into the common functional areas of the C2X. The participants must do this early and formalize a CI and HUMINT appendix to the CTF's OPOD.

In resolving these C2 issues, the senior intelligence officers in the CTF, the C2, C2X, and the chief of the combined intelligence support element become diplomats in uniform, employing interpersonal and cross-cultural communications skills to ensure a unity of effort to achieve shared coalition goals and objectives. They must match the unique capabilities and limitations of each national and Service contingent to the needs of the entire force.

The second major factor separating a J2X from a C2X is the distinction the United States makes between CI and HUMINT. While they recognize the functional differences between CI and HUMINT, British and Australian personnel perform both activities. The United States is the only American-

British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) nation whose personnel, particularly those of AFOSI and NCIS as criminal investigative-oriented organizations, are operationally "firewalled" between the two disciplines. This is important because in a C2X the deconfliction does not occur between the HOC and TFCICA, but between national contingents. The United States, however, must still have a separate HOC and TFCICA to deconflict taskings levied upon U.S. assets.

Communications. The deployable local area network (LAN) was provided by Headquarters, NCIS. It allowed for timely and secure E-mail tasking, reporting, and dissemination (both within the C2X and externally) to components, exercise controllers, and scripters.

While this system worked well, it led to even better ideas on improving CI and HUMINT communications in a contingency. In the after-action review, several players requested standardized, computer menu-driven tasking and reporting formats. Ideally, such a system




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


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Communications. The deployable local area network (LAN) was provided by Headquarters, NCIS. It allowed for timely and secure E-mail tasking, reporting, and dissemination (both within the C2X and externally) to components, exercise controllers, and scripters.

While this system worked well, it led to even better ideas on improving CI and HUMINT communications in a contingency. In the after-action review, several players requested standardized, computer menu-driven tasking and reporting formats. Ideally, such a system

could use a browser server similar to the U.S. INTELINK.

Language Barriers. Although one might think that three English-speaking militaries would have no problems talking to each other, Vigilant Blade 97 showed that this is not always true. In addition to friendly banter over the spelling of such words as defence and organisation, misunderstandings occurred because of national and Service-unique use of common words, military argot, and especially acronyms.

In one example, an Australian team reported that a terrorist group occupied an *abatoir* in the U.S. sector. None of the American players knew that an *abatoir* is another word for a slaughterhouse. Different definitions of military terms can also cause confusion. "Screening" and "debriefing", for instance, have different doctrinal connotations depending on the nationality of the speaker and the speaker's function, be it CI or HUMINT.

To prevent such misunderstandings in multinational operations, all operational plans, OPODs, and reports should be prepared in standard English (understandable to American and British readers) and acronyms should be avoided.

The preparer should err on the side of caution, explaining in detail any terms or concepts that anyone could misinterpret.

Individual and Team Skills. In addition to the different perspectives on the use of interrogation noted above, Vigilant Blade 97 brought to light different approaches and techniques for source collection, CI missions, and staff procedures. As one example, British HUMINT teams conduct tactical static surveillance of personnel and facilities in a manner similar in many respects to infantry observation posts and Army long-range surveillance operations. To share such unique perspectives and differing tradecraft, each of the player teams used informal exchanges of personnel, in addition to the formally structured Combined Air Forces and Combined Naval Forces teams.

Conclusions

Vigilant Blade 97 achieved its objectives and strengthened U.S. intelligence interoperability with two of our closest allies. It also contributed to evolution of the J2X and C2X doctrine, the way our military supports the joint and combined force commander with CI and HUMINT.

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by Staff Sergeant
Timothy D. Tolison

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The company consists of eight GSS teams, five from the organic 311th assets and three teams from the 103d MI Battalion. There are also six tactical human intelligence (TAC HUMINT) teams, which provide force protection to the supported battalion task forces of 3d Brigade. The company is task-organized with soldiers from 13 Active and Reserve Component units.

Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance System (REMBASS) operations changed significantly in its peacekeeping role during OJG, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Task Force (TF) Eagle intelligence requirements moved beyond merely confirming or denying activity. The GSS teams had the mission to monitor the resettle-

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
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Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System.

any unusual activity between mid-night and dawn, such as persons moving along trails or routes. A one-page document, the REMBASS summary (REMSUM), synopsized activity during the prior evening. This document eased communication flow between the teams and the S2. The REMSUM allowed the S2 to have a clear picture of the activity in the sector overnight. As time passed, the teams began to see patterns forming and this required more detailed analysis.

The teams do not receive schooling to conduct analysis, and the trained intelligence analysts did not have time to analyze the tremendous amount of information.

Therefore, the GSS teams had to fill this void. Teams assisted the S2 in many ways and became very active in conducting analysis. After analysis, the teams reevaluated the mission and decided to move the sensors off approved (engineer cleared) routes. More resettlement was occurring and it was obvious that no one conducting hostile acts would infiltrate along routes of heavy Stabilization Force (SFOR) patrolling. This led to phase two of the operation: authorization for the teams to operate off approved routes.

Phase Two

Given the very real land mine threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the teams needed force protection.

They incorporated combat engineers into the plan. The engineers' primary responsibility was to probe and proof the implant site as well as to provide additional security for the teams. The engineers performed flawlessly and established a habitual relationship with the teams. This performance and relationship ensured the protection of soldiers and equipment.

The platoon gained second-source confirmation by using the TAC HUMINT teams to confirm activity that the GSS teams were reported through local sources. TAC HUMINT was also helpful with cross-cueing. In other words, the TAC HUMINT-gathered information helped the S2 know where to focus sensor strings for future operations. This tactic yielded big dividends.

The teams conducted more than 80 missions in heavily mined areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina for an extended period at night and off cleared routes. They continued to conduct dismounted operations and became the resident experts for their area of operations. The GSS teams earned the respect and admiration of commanders throughout TF Eagle and other military units and many units recognized them as the ones who knew the area better than any others.

REMBASS has been a force multiplier for Task Force Eagle. Through detailed planning and nearly flawless execution, the teams have made a difference and have made commanders more aware of the assets that are available to them. The new doctrine, which the teams helped establish, will aid in training other soldiers in the future.

Staff Sergeant Tolison is a ground surveillance system squad leader in the 311th MI Battalion at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.



Collection Focus Development in Peacekeeping Operations

by Major Timothy L. Faulkner

The purpose of collection focus development (CFD) is to identify the commander's intelligence requirements, hot spots (potential areas of violence), named areas of interest (NAIs), and high-payoff targets (HPTs). It also helps develop tasks and purposes for our collectors. CFD is a part of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process that is employed continually in peacekeeping operations (PKOs). By exploiting CFD, the maneuver staff is proactive in collection planning, and this facilitates the use of all staff elements employed in a peacekeeping environment.

The S2 section is essential in identifying hot spots and assisting the commander to establish a scheme of maneuver to prevent violence and protect the force (prevention phase). This consists of:

- Patrolling, using counterintelligence (CI) and civil affairs (CA) teams.
- Conducting information operations (IO) and psychological operations (PSYOPS).
- Implementing temporary check points (TCPs).
- Creating a geographical inner ring to isolate the contentious area.
- Creating an outer ring to prevent influences entering an area.

Done correctly, CFD enables the unit—I will use a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in my discussion—to detect and possibly defuse a developing hot spot, and to prevent the BCT from becoming a reactionary force.

CFD Model

Because this is within a PKO model, I suggest CFD begin during the initial mission analysis and continue through the orders issuance. This process will repeat throughout the deployment. The CFD process comprises seven phases.

Develop and identify priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

From the commander's mission statement, develop information requirements (IR) which will support the execution of the mission. The commander selects his PIR from the IR list. Next, the S2 develops indicators for each PIR (see Figure 1) and distributes them to the lowest level. Validate your indicators by wargaming them with staff elements and other S2s. Having a PIR without indicators ensures that none of your collectors will answer that PIR. Use weighting criteria for

PIR
Where and when will a potential opposing force (paramilitary organization, religious faction, or political party) organize, direct, or influence a civilian demonstration or harass BCT soldiers?

Indicators

- Populace increasingly dissatisfied with refugee returns.
- Populace increasingly concerned about its safety and security.
- Radio station supervisors refuse to allow BCT/battalion commanders air time.
- Increase in price of local goods.
- Frequent unexplained power outages.
- Names of paramilitary groups written in public places.
- Personnel with handheld radios at demonstrations.
- Political groups passing out anti-BCT pamphlets.
- Hard-line political parties threaten soldiers.
- Hard-line political parties threaten U.N. or NGO organizations.
- Local police chief claims inability to control public reactions.
- Increased sightings of paramilitary personnel.
- Mayors accuse soldiers of partiality towards entity.

Key: U.N. United Nations
NGO Non-governmental organization

Figure 1. A Sample Priority Intelligence Requirement and its Indicators.

each indicator. With each indicator hit, the overall assessment will change from green, to yellow, or to red. Remember that you may be depending on a young soldier on patrol to identify indicators crucial to the success of your unit.

Determine sector hot spots.

The S2 identifies the potential hot spots based on intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), special operations reports, PIR indicators, division analysis and control element (ACE) assessments, CI and CA team reports, BCT analysis, and staff input. This intelligence officer analyzes all significant future events and prioritizes these events to determine which are more likely to elicit a violent response. The result is a potential hot spot list (see Figure 2); the staff and BCT assets should focus on the top three or four hot spots.

Develop the collection plan.

Based on the collection focus, the S2 selects NAIs. (In PKOs, the NAIs are not limited to a geographic location on the battlefield.) Next, the S2 develops purposes and tasks for each mission and assigns specific information requests (SIRs); the S3 reviews each SIR. After validation of the SIRs, the S2 places each one on an IR register to establish an audit trail and assigns the LTIOV (latest time the information is of value).

The S3 reviews the troops-to-tasks matrix and may require additional assets. The S2 will then request the additional intelligence collectors through the collection manager at the division. The Analysis and Control Team (ACT) generates requests for information (RFIs) on any question that brigade assets cannot satisfy.

S3 publishes collection order.

The S2 provides the intelligence paragraph and the collection plan for the S3's collection order, which tasks the units to execute the collection matrix. All of the brigade's S2s will answer their SIRs by the approved tracking method in nightly INTSUMs.

Evaluate reporting and dissemination.

The brigade S2 will evaluate and verify the validity of information received and share all answered SIRs with the staff elements and disseminate them to higher and lower headquarters. The S2 also provides feedback to the collectors. Any unanswered information requirements may necessitate redirecting an asset or retasking.

Verify hot spots. Any information that answers or confirms the possibility of violence requires the




Figure 2. Hot Spot List Development.

attention of all staff elements. (Figure 3 shows an example of tracking several hot spots and the responsible collectors.) If the collectors' SIRs deny (do not support) the possibility of violence, then you must move on to different events in your sector. Some information might cause the S2 to readjust a PIR or indicator. Once the S2 feels comfortable with the collection focus, the cycle begins again.

Summary

Collection focus development in peacekeeping operations requires staff element synchronization to create an effective collection order and matrix. The S5 and the information officer become more significant combat multipliers than the fire support officer is. Political figures such as mayors and regional police chiefs will have a greater influence on operations than will an enemy mechanized brigade. During CFD, use the different reports and staff elements to assist in identifying potential hot spots, wargame these possible events, and focus the unit's efforts against them. This ensures the defusing of a situation before it becomes violent. When collecting against a target, have task and purpose

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Figure 3. Example of a Matrix Tracking Hot Spots.

statements included in the collection order. This will ensure that the soldier on the ground understands the mission and seeks the information the unit desires. Remember the battlefield is all around you in PKOs. Having a strong command of the CFD process will prevent a volatile situation from developing further.

The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Captain Matthew Helm and the Iron Brigade staff.

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Phone: (520) 533-6579; DSN 821-6579

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Website: <http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/111MI/305th/305welcm.htm>

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


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 204-444-3241/3204 RHP

Phone: (520) 533-7552/204-424-8572

105th MI Battalion Courses

Website: <http://www.usajc.army.mil/CH000Training.html>
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Lessons Learned from a Unified Endeavor Collection Manager

by Captain Vincent H. Torres

Imagine being the collection manager (CM) in a light infantry division thrust into the role of an Army Forces (ARFOR) CM for a multinational joint exercise involving 30,000 troops. The assets available for tasking include division, theater, and national collectors.

The first thing to understand is what a CM's job entails. The collection management officer (CMO) tasks intelligence assets to collect against a particular location for a specific period of time to support the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

The CM is responsible for the development and synchronization of the ARFOR collection plan. He ensures that the collection plan focuses on the commander's PIR and determines the gaps in intelligence and knowledge concerning the threat. He requests information from appropriate collection agencies to fill those gaps. The CMO works in the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) for the G2.

Differences Between a Division CMO and an ARFOR CMO

The major difference between working as a division CMO and an ARFOR CMO is the type and amount of collection assets the CMO can plan and employ (see Figure 1). The range of collectors and amount of redundancy drastically differ from a division to an ARFOR.

The planning considerations at ARFOR level link to the targeting cell. Collection assets at the theater and national level required a 48 to 72 hour leadtime. In addition to the planning considerations, priority of effort played an important role in determining coverage for scarce assets. Dynamic retasking of the U-2 was possible through the downlink to the Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC) and was extremely effective in supporting the ARFOR commander. Furthermore, the ARFOR was part of a Joint Task Force (JTF) comprised of forces from the Marines (MARFOR), Air Force (AFFOR), Navy (NAVFOR), and United Kingdom (UK) Forces. Communication among differing component computer systems, mili-

tary lexicons, and standing operating procedures (SOPs) provided new challenges.

The Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) and the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were extremely valuable to the collection planner. The GRCS cued the UAV to cover a particular named area of interest (NAI) or target. The range and versatility of these systems gave the ARFOR the "eyes" it needed to deliver its punch.

The use of Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Community Online Intelligence Systems For End Users And Managers (COLISEUM) software, and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) by the JTF allowed for faster information flow and quicker response time. The use of COLISEUM in tracking requests for information (RFIs) was a tremendous asset. JDISS E-mail was an integral part of dissemination and analyst dialogue. Posting intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and other products on the SIPRNET homepage allowed for easier transfer of voluminous intelligence to a greater audience.




Figure 1. ARFOR and Division Intelligence Assets.

Video teleconferences (VTCs) played a vital role in our communication with other members of the JTF. To get a clearer picture of the battlefield and exchange information, all sections used the VTC. Sections held VTCs at least once daily and more often depending on the situation. The primary focus of the CMO's VTC was to verify collection requirements for upcoming missions and to provide tasking input for theater and national collection assets.

The Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) was dedicated to collection in the JTF rear area and primarily used to locate Special Operational Forces (SOF) units and terrorist activity. Additionally, the task-organization of intelli-

gence assets included placing various collectors under the control of the ARFOR rear command post since they were responsible for the JTF rear area.

Path to Success

Flexibility. The most important facet of the collection plan is flexibility. The CMO builds flexibility into the intelligence synchronization matrix (ISM), attempting to balance the collection methodology against the anticipated or likely enemy course of action. This dynamic process shifts the emphasis from the deep, close, and rear areas of the battlefield. The ISM must include a mix of collection assets with redundancy of coverage.

Mission Management. The intense speed of battle, the equipment, and intelligence report communication requirements mandate proper procedures to record and display the results. A useful technique involved colored "sticky notes." A "sticky note" was placed on the map indicated when an NAI was active and the color identified what asset was covering it. For example, a blue note may have indicated a UAV was covering the NAI.

Identification of the Best Indicators. The purpose of an indicator is to give advance notice of an event. Indicators that are concise, defined, and quantifiable serve this purpose. All the collectors and analysts must know the indicators; the

daily collection-emphasis message disseminates them.

Staffing. An ARFOR collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section must receive augmentation to provide 24-hour support for current and future operations. During Unified Endeavor, the CM&D section required six additional personnel to operate the JDISS terminal, meet the nonstandard dissemination requirements such as posting information to the homepage, and to manage the additional ARFOR collection assets.

Linkage to Targeting. The CMO is an essential person on the targeting team. The identification of targets and battle damage assessment (BDA) are essential elements of a collection plan. The CMO is involved directly in the decision, detection, deliverance, and assessment elements of targeting.

Knowledge of Intelligence Systems and Asset Capabilities. The CMO must know the collection assets' capabilities in all weather and terrain conditions. The quality of the reports, as well as the quantity, relates directly to the correct emplacement of the systems. The CMO's experience and knowledge of the system determines success.




Figure 2. ARFOR Intelligence Operations.

System Connectivity and Information Management. All systems have to "speak" the same language on the correct networks. Developing an intelligence architecture in conjunction with the JTF, the other components, and also the G6, with primary and alternate paths is necessary for success. Additionally, there must be a detailed information management plan to ensure the proper routing of messages and reports.

Conclusion

As an ARFOR collection manager, you must have the level of knowledge and expertise of a corps collection manager. This knowledge base includes an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of corps, theater, and national systems. It is also important to think "deep" to support the targeting process 72 hours ahead. This is also important for ensuring the inclusion of aerial collection assets on the order and their availability to collect at the desired time. Finally, it is important to understand the joint systems such as JDISS and software applications such as COLISEUM that you will be required to use, and how you will integrate your Army systems (all-source analysis system) into disseminating that information.




Figure 3. Approximate System Collection Ranges.

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Terrain Support to Joint IPB— A Unified Endeavor Experience

by Chief Warrant Officer Three
Scott J. Maxner

Fall 1997 found the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) involved in Exercise Unified Endeavor (UE) 98-1, a joint and multinational training event. One purpose of the exercise was to train the Joint Task Force (JTF) component commanders and staffs on JTF operations. The 10th Mountain Division (LT) served as the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) subordinate to a Marine-commanded JTF also comprising of a U.S. Marine Force (MARFOR), U.S. Navy Force (NAVFOR), U.S. Air Force (AFFOR), and United Kingdom Forces (UKFOR).

Robust as the JTF was, a lingering issue was who would provide the standard and nonstandard terrain and topographic product support to the military decision-making process (MDMP) at each echelon. The 10th Mountain Division (LT) Terrain Detachment (ARFOR component) conducted the mission for the UE 98-1 JTF. Planning and execution are dependent on METT-T (mission enemy terrain troops, and time available). A JTF headquarters should have its own attached terrain and topographic detachment to create intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products and to articulate the effects of terrain on enemy and friendly courses of action. Initially, dissemination of products should be to all JTF subordinate staffs, ensuring a common view of the battlefield, top to bottom (See Figures 1 and 2).

Doctrinal Acceptance

Many Army terms (such as IPB, MDMP, METT-T) may be familiar to Army readers, but the joint community does not formally recognize them. Add other nations as part of the coalition, and it confuses terms further. Joint terminology differs from that of the Army. Although each service performs and incorporates many related topographic functions, there is a doctrinal void for a formal planning approach. For the Army, there is a system injected in all planning staffs. The Army IPB system works and is doctrinally supported by **FM 34-130**, 8 July 1994, **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**. Three spheres can graphically depict the IPB triad; they interlock because each facet affects the others. No one discipline (intelligence, terrain, or weather) could adequately fulfill the IPB process.

Not surprisingly, ground forces place emphasis on analyzing, understanding, and exploiting terrain. According to **Army FM 100-5, Operations**, the battlefield's organization includes deep, close, and rear operations. The manual further states that only ground forces can dominate terrain and that it takes close operations on land to gain decisive and lasting battlefield effects.

Terrain detachments are organic to all divisions and higher headquarters within the Army. The Air Force and Navy have no terrain detachments. Furthermore, the full scope is not only an analysis and

production issue but also includes interpretation and communication of terrain information. To describe the battlespace to the commander is to highlight essential points relating to the subordinate commanders' battlespace as well. The JTF battlefield framework must incorporate a thorough knowledge of the ground maneuver area of operations (AO).

Proper terrain research and analysis is highly technical and requires school-trained terrain and topographic technicians and analyst experts (Army Occupational Specialties 215D—Warrant Officer or 81T—Enlisted). When quantitative and qualitative analysis blends with clear and concise intelligence information (textual, graphical, and briefed) decision-makers should gain a feeling of confidence about the AO. Without adequate topographic input, a JTF commander may not make the most informed decision.

A topographic element must reside within a JTF Intelligence Directorate for the planning effort to be comprehensive. This facilitates topographic information flow, product creation and dissemination and insight for interpretation; ensures information is "pushed" down to subordinate commands (see **Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations**, pages III-41-42 and 21-22). A terrain element builds confidence among staffs and helps ensure a common view of the AO environment from top to bottom. Com-

| G=Green A=Amber R=Red | | | Key: GPS Global Positioning System HET Heavy Equipment Transport HF High Frequency LOC Line of Communication | LOS Line of Sight Mech Mechanized OPTEMPO Operational tempo |
|-----------------------|-----|---|---|---|
| Maneuver | (G) | Speed, range, accuracy, night capability = Combat Multipliers | | |
| Dismounts | (R) | Poor concealment/cover; mechanized. OPTEMPO fast. | | |
| Wheel | (G) | Excellent trafficability; rain degrades loose surface roads. | | |
| Track | (G) | Excellent trafficability; rain improves off-route movement. | | |
| Aviation | (A) | Limited terrain masking. | | |
| Engineer | (G) | Robust engineer package augmented by Host nation construction equipment; use of quarries and berms. | | |
| Fire Support | (G) | Current data can triangulate enemy positions. | | |
| Air Defense | (G) | Targets acquired at maximum effective ranges (extended LOS). | | |
| Intelligence | (G) | Position of engineer assets should identify enemy main effort. | | |
| Service Support | (A) | Limited LOCs to support continuous heavy haul HETs essential to off-route movement of logistics items | | |
| Command & Control | (G) | Extended battlespace requires use of GPS, HF communications and reliance on small unit integrity and actions. | | |

Figure 1. A Sample Product for Friendly Forces Operations.

manders can now leverage terrain information. The joint intelligence community should accept and embrace terrain information as part of the joint intelligence preparation of the battlefield (JIPB) process and must be willing to resource it. The question is how?

Resourcing the Requirement

A JIPB Terrain Intelligence Team provides ready-to-use IPB products and AO knowledge to contribute to the JTF's planning effort (See Figures 1 and 2). A database of products should exist for the JTF proposed AO. One must consider a number of factors when task-organizing terrain assets (soldiers and equipment) to support a JTF J2—

- Does the standing JTF have organic or attached topographic assets?

- Where is the AO?
- Does an adequate AO database exist or must you start from scratch?
- Who holds the "real world" terrain database for the AO?
- What are the anticipated production requirements?
- What is the JTF size (influences reproduction and dissemination quantities)?
- Will non-U.S. coalition forces be on the dissemination list? What are the releasability caveats?
- Is there a budget for the terrain-topographic detachment?

Regardless of where the supporting terrain detachment emerges, the team needs lead time before the JTF planning phase. Although a real-world contingency may preclude such advance warning, four to six months is optimal. The detachment must have the proper

equipment to focus on AO research, build or create a database, and develop and disseminate customized products for the JTF and subordinate commands. An ARFOR (or JTF) topographic detachment formed from an Army divisional terrain detachment requires augmentation with an additional Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor (MSIP) and four soldiers. Augmentation is required to handle development of products at multiple map scales, assist with AO research and analysis, and to allow the detachment to balance additional competing requirements supporting ongoing missions.

Add a topographic team, squad, or detachment to the Joint Manning Document that defines a JTF staff. Perhaps each command could establish a full-time topographic team (white cell) to build, update, and

| | | |
|----------------------|-----|---|
| Maneuver | (R) | Greater than normal doctrinal depths to objectives. Battle pace/OPTEMPO fast and demanding long movement along gravel plain depletes stockages. |
| Dismount | (R) | Poor concealment/cover; OPTEMPO too fast to support. |
| Wheel | (A) | Tire stock depleted due to long movement across gravel. |
| Track | (A) | Quarries and berms will divert/impede movement T72 auto load function forces shot over vehicle forward end. |
| Aviation | (R) | Density altitude reduces cargo capacity (lift). |
| Engineer | (A) | Berms must be breached or bypassed; limited ability to concentrate engineer efforts across extended front. |
| Fire Support | (R) | Limited natural survivability positions; caches must be forward. |
| Air Defense | (A) | Limited masking terrain; visual line of sight dependent. |
| Engineer | (G) | Lessons learned from previous conflict applied. |
| Service Support | (R) | LOCs limited; extended. No major water facilities to support large operation. |
| Command & Control | (A) | Extended battlespace degrades ability to conduct large scale operation. |

Figure 2. A Sample Product for Enemy Operations.

manage a current database for all potential exercise AOs. The white cell would interpret, reproduce, and replicate terrain products that a regional commander would have to support an operations plan (OPLAN) or contingency plan (CONPLAN). The team would serve as a liaison between major Army command (MACOM) topographic detachments responsible for the AO. Additionally, it would interface with national agencies and joint service components to develop (and serve as a conduit for) topographic product support.

The resident topographic team would report directly to the JTF headquarters for the exercise duration. The team would conduct initial briefings to the JTF headquarters (e.g. Atlantic MARFOR and JTF), hand off products (standard, nonstandard, photos, imagery, etc.), and establish contact with other JTF subordinate topo-

graphic detachments. JTF's subordinate command's topographic teams should be on board early. Commands should make special efforts to assist the Air Force and Navy in developing IPB. The proposed staffing and equipment listing (shown in Figure 3) may serve as a guideline.

Increased staffs are a difficult proposition during a period of force reductions. However, given the amount of time and confusion caused in creating and recreating products, the suggested staff would increase JTF readiness and enhance the JTF's ability to focus on the mission.

Production and Information Dissemination

In UE 98-1, the exercise scope and large AO required the division terrain detachment (ARFOR) to straddle between the standard tactical-level analysis and production

focus (1:50,000 or 1:100,000 scale) and the operational level (1:250,000). The ARFOR commander needs macro- and micro-situational awareness, from knowledge of the logistical capacities of aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) throughput capacities, to the facilitation of RSOI reception staging onward movement and integration of the forces in the theater. In the physical environment where the battle might occur 70 to 150 kilometers away, for example, the soil may not permit the digging of fighting positions. More likely than not, choosing a map scale is more a function of logistics (mapboard size to cover the AO or zone) than the foregoing information and detail.

Although it may appear academic to simply work at a particular map scale to conduct planning throughout the MDMP, a divisional terrain

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Personnel | |
| 1x | Chief Warrant Officer Three/Four (CW3/4) (215D)- Commander |
| 1x | CW2/Warrant Officer One (WO1) (215D)-Production Officer-in-Charge (OIC) |
| 1x | E7 (81T or Marine equivalent)-Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge (NCOIC) (administration support) and Joint IPB Terrain Senior Analyst; should possess the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) "2S" (Army, NCO Battle Staff Course, Fort Bliss, Texas.) |
| 1x | E6 (81T or Marine equivalent) |
| 1x | E5 (81T or Marine equivalent)-Assistant production team leader |
| 4x | E4 (81T or Marine equivalent)-MSIP operators |
| Equipment | |
| 2x | MSIP: imagery processing and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) functions. This includes scanners and large format output devices (plotters). |
| 2x | DIAZO machines: ammonia-based blueprint style reproduction |
| 2x | Desktop processors and laser printer |
| 2x | Laptops |
| 2x | Scanners, desk top |
| 2x | Secure telephones, STU-B III |
| 1x | Facsimile (FAX) machine |

Figure 3. Staffing and Equipment Listing for the JTF Topographic Element.

detachment cannot divorce itself from the tactical fight. A number of tactical considerations may lead to operational impacts on which the commander may base decisions. Consequently, products at both tactical and operational scales would be needed, an arduous task for a 9-soldier unit.

A common picture of the battlefield allows a commander to respond deliberately to sequencing an efficient and successful operation. Pertinent intelligence information should be "pushed" down or available for subordinate commands to "pull"; this includes terrain products. In UE 98-1, we disseminated terrain products to customers via telephone, facsimile (classified and unclassified), overnight mail, and the normal hard-copy distribution system.

Releasability. Remember that UE 98-1 was a multinational exercise. The author understands how

vital information security is and the implications that breaches may have on our national security. Planning staffs of all nations, Services, and components rely on current and accurate information to generate a comprehensive plan to accomplish each higher command's objectives. Undoubtedly, those objectives relate to the National Command Authority (NCA) requirements. The paradox is that the very benefits that a "not releasable to foreign national" (NOFORN) handling caveat is trying to effect becomes a potential hindrance to the operation. Units conducting an operation need the best information possible to make informed decisions.

Information Sources (Classified versus Unclassified Open Sources). As a terrain detachment conducts AO research and analysis, it sorts through volumes of messages, reports, documents, and images to add credibility to its

work. In many cases, information derived from our national assets has blanket Secret NOFORN markings. What information is actually of NOFORN significance? Many times subparagraphs do not have individual markings. In many cases, one may find the information through open sources. This poses a challenge to a detachment with JTF production requirements. For example, the MSIP can integrate high-resolution imagery into products, perhaps highlighting some crucial areas, items, or both. The end product is a fantastic way to communicate terrain information. However, because the imagery is NOFORN, allied Services cannot have it—a big problem if that unit might be on your unit's left or right. Information accessibility among the coalition should not cause hostility. This issue needs resolution at the JTF level or higher—and needs it early.

Conclusion

A JTF requires timely, accurate, and relevant topographic products and support early on. The task organization of joint and multinational forces requires analysis addressing topographic and terrain shortcomings. U.S. forces must organizationally and doctrinally incorporate a topographic detachment into the J2 staff to work JIPB, and we must overcome the challenge of information handling caveats.

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Closing the Intelligence Gap in the OMFTS Concept

by Major Harry E. Jones, II

When I took a decision or adopted an alternative—it was after studying every relevant—and many an irrelevant—factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my finger ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side.

—T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), 1933

America's Naval Services have taken an aggressive step towards revolutionizing the nature of amphibious operations with the development of complementary concepts called *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (OMFTS) and *Ship to Objective Maneuver* (STOM). These concepts envision a host of emerging technologies

such as tilt-rotor aircraft, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), and precision fires enabling Marine and Navy forces to strike swiftly inland at ranges up to 200 nautical miles from the shoreline. This is the vision of OMFTS/STOM; however, the Naval Services have paid insufficient attention to the requirement for **precision intelligence** to support OMFTS.

Without changes in current planning doctrine and more aggressive funding of intelligence systems, the Marine Corps may never achieve the OMFTS vision. This article will analyze some of the intelligence requirements and shortfalls associated with OMFTS and will provide solutions to address the current

challenge.

OMFTS: An Overview

Throughout history, including the massive assaults at Normandy and on the island of Okinawa, amphibious commanders had to wait for a ponderous buildup of materiel and supplies ashore prior to striking inland. This buildup of supplies created an unavoidable operational pause, which in turn created a window of opportunity for an aggressive opponent to counterattack the beachhead and mass fires on following echelons of assault craft maneuvering ashore. In the near future, amphibious operators employing OMFTS/STOM technologies may launch directly from a ship lying over the horizon, cross the beach flying nap of the earth at

well over 200 knots, and assault an objective before the defender even knows that he is under attack.

As envisioned, OMFTS/STOM will decrease the risk to the amphibious task force by keeping vulnerable ships out of the range of most land-based anti-ship missiles. Additionally, according to OMFTS/STOM proponents, maneuver from the sea can generate operational tempo beyond the enemy's capability to respond effectively. With OMFTS/STOM, the enemy's coast becomes an exposed flank along which he must extend his defense to counter an amphibious assault. Forced to sacrifice depth and unable to judge where best to position a counterattack force, the enemy commander is left with a host of poor options to defend against U.S. maneuver from the sea.

The Role of Intelligence in OMFTS

While much good thought has gone into the OMFTS/STOM concept, the intelligence battlespace function has received remarkably little attention. Arguably, there can be no OMFTS/STOM without accurate, timely, relevant intelligence. In the rush to develop enabling technologies like the AAV and MV-22, OMFTS/STOM proponents have ignored a simple truth: one cannot maneuver against an enemy who is unlocated and whose most likely course of action (COA) remains darkly shrouded in the fog of war.

Writing in "Operational Maneuver from the Sea—A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore," OMFTS/STOM proponents express the opinion that OMFTS requires that intelligence be provided to decision-makers with a minimum of delay. Technology that permits the rapid dissemination of intelligence products will play an important role in this effort. However, the key to effective intelligence support of OMFTS lies in

the orientation of intelligence specialists. In particular, intelligence specialists must be capable of rapidly making educated judgments about what the enemy is likely to do."

This vision for intelligence is not adequate. Several essential pieces are missing, the first of which is the role of intelligence in planning. The draft Marine Corps planning process promulgated by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program does not require a credible effort up front by the intelligence officer. The critical output of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process—viable, aggressive enemy COAs—is virtually ignored until the operators have completed mission analysis and initiated friendly COA development.

The Army has learned, after years of calamitous failures at the Service training centers, that intelligence must drive operations. Specifically, early in the mission analysis process, the intelligence officer must develop realistic, viable, aggressive enemy COAs which are inherently dangerous to friendly mission accomplishment. Only then can the operators develop feasible friendly COAs. The first step to realizing the OMFTS/STOM vision requires closing the intelligence gap in draft Marine Corps planning doctrine. It is unrealistic to expect intelligence specialists to "*rapidly [make] educated judgments of what the enemy is likely to do.*" Those same specialists have had little or no initial input to the planning process and have not been held accountable for playing the thinking, learning, aggressive enemy commander in COA development and analysis.

To enable intelligence to fully support OMFTS/STOM, Marine Corps doctrine must recognize the importance of intelligence and fully integrate it into the various Marine planning processes. In staff plan-

ning, the intelligence officer must arrive at the initial mission analysis working session armed with a current situation update, most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs, and an initial analysis of the battlespace—the area of operations and the area of interest, and the effect the terrain and weather will have on friendly and enemy operations. Essentially, this officer must complete the four IPB steps before the balance of the staff begins mission analysis.

Why is this important? Because having the G2's or S2's analysis of the enemy's COAs will drive how the staff frames their subsequent efforts. It also allows the staff's duty experts to aid the G2 in refining the IPB effort as they conduct their functional analyses. If, for example the G2 envisions a significant rear area threat, the G3 (operations), G4 (logistics), and G1 (personnel) officers need to know this information, as it may affect the size and capability of the tactical combat force, the security posture of the units in the rear, and a variety of other factors. If the G2 envisions potential humanitarian disasters occurring as a result of enemy action, then responding to these crises may become branches to the current plan or sequels to be executed at change of mission. Finally, and perhaps most critically in mid- to high-intensity operations, the result of the IPB effort will drive mission taskings to reconnaissance and security forces, who will then begin the critical fight to gather, and deny the enemy's ability to gather information. Knowing what the G2 believes the enemy's moves will be provides a critical framework for friendly mission planning. IPB must occur early, and it must be accurate and continuous. Most importantly, it must precede mission analysis.

As a corollary, Marine intelligence specialists must rise to the challenge and drive operations with valid IPB products. These

same specialists must have command support to do their jobs well. A seasoned infantry brigade commander in Germany in the early 1990s referred to the IPB process as commander's preparation of the battlefield. He took personal interest in the S2's efforts, trained him on what was expected, and held his S2 accountable for leading the staff's IPB efforts. The net result was an intelligence section capable of producing valid, usable IPB products that enhanced operational planning, and a battlestaff for whom it was unthinkable to begin planning any operation without the S2's initial IPB.

Amending current Marine Corps planning doctrine and putting the onus on intelligence officers to drive operations with valid IPB products early in the mission analysis step is a relatively inexpensive and rapidly achievable solution. Training intelligence staffs to meet this new requirement will take some time, but the payoff, as the Army has learned, is worth the effort.

Intelligence Systems' Support to OMFTS

A second area in which OMFTS/STOM falls short in the intelligence function is in the fielding strategy for collection systems. The Marine Corps is purchasing some capable systems, including the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Common Ground Station (CGS) but they are slow in arriving to the fleet, and in some cases are of insufficient quantity to adequately support a deployed MAGTF. In the case of the Joint STARS CGS, the Marine Corps plans to buy only two systems. These systems are scheduled to arrive in the Fleet Marine Force in the third quarter of fiscal year 1999, with one system each to I and II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). While the Joint STARS system has limitations, the CGS provides a very powerful capability for a deployed commander to ac-

cess moving target indicator (MTI) data, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and secondary imagery from a variety of sources and display all this data on a single screen. The CGS requires a single high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), so it requires little space aboard amphibious shipping.

Consider this vignette: a friendly objective lies 200 nautical miles inland. A motorized rifle battalion defends this objective onto which the friendly forces intend to maneuver from the sea. The enemy is dug in to turret defilade with overhead cover. Dense vegetation negates the optical sensor suite on the friendly force's UAVs, rendering them useless. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery from a high-altitude UAV picks out amorphous shapes, that may be camouflaged fighting vehicles, but the imagery is of insufficient granularity for targeting of precision long-range fires.

With communications wire between positions, the enemy commander has not used his radio in several hours, rendering friendly communications intelligence (COMINT) ineffective. Aggressive enemy patrols have forced friendly reconnaissance teams to pull back. A Joint STARS aircraft detects some vehicle movement, but lacking a Joint STARS CGS, the Marine commander must wait for his intelligence section to "pull" the moving target indicator (MTI) data from the higher headquarters operations center where the CGS is located. Scanning the fire sack to his front, the enemy commander waits expectantly for the relatively soft-skinned Ospreys and AAAs to appear.

In his combat operations center (COC) afloat, the friendly commander grows more anxious by the hour. The S2 had predicted infantry in platoon-sized elements near the objective—but as H-Hour ap-

proaches, with AAAs beginning to warm up their engines in the well deck, the picture grows no clearer. The very capable naval tactical missiles and naval surface fire support systems remain silent, rendered impotent by a lack of accurate enemy locational data.


Alternatively, imagine a peace-keeping scenario where a MAGTF commander's mission is to establish a zone of separation (ZOS) between former warring factions. As the Marines begin to occupy the ZOS, a Predator UAV images a faction patrol moving an armored vehicle toward the Marines in the ZOS, a clear violation of the recently signed peace accords. Unable to receive the Predator imagery in near-real time, the MAGTF commander is unaware of the threat and therefore is powerless to stop what has become a movement to contact with potentially disastrous results.

Solutions

Such a scenario is impossible, OMFTS/STOM proponents will argue. Is it? An experienced, aggressive adversary can mitigate many of our most powerful capabilities to locate and target him. To counter this, commanders now, and in the future, will rely on advanced multidiscipline (human intelligence (HUMINT), SIGINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), and measurable signals intelligence (MASINT) sensor packages capable of linking together and correlating disparate pieces of data in real time, with critical enemy intelligence then broadcast to multiple echelons simultaneously. This level of intelligence requires intelligence specialists who understand their commander's intent and the friendly mission, understand IPB's inseparable link to effective planning, and who can rapidly assimilate disparate pieces of data into intelligence using information sys-

(Continued on page 49)

THE PRECISION SIGINT TARGETING SYSTEM



by Lieutenant Commander Michael V. Cooperwood (USN) and Major John F. Petrik (USAR)

How do you get accurate target locations? Members of targeting cells distinguish targets from target indicators, which yield insufficiently accurate geolocation. Some of the United States' most expensive and powerful collection assets—notably signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems—seem to fire support personnel too remote to be of any direct utility.

That view is not correct. Target indicators are invaluable in intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), in cueing other assets capable of more precise target location, and in templating enemy activity. Furthermore, the design of the national systems was to meet national purposes; for security reasons, they often are deliberately difficult to access at tactical echelons. Nonetheless, the issue remains for targeters and intelligence personnel: why can we not derive targets from SIGINT?

Precision SIGINT Targeting System

The problem is not unique to the Army. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has long recognized that SIGINT's considerable targeting potential was largely unrealized, and in 1994 took the lead in a joint effort to change that fact. In 1995, the Precision SIGINT Targeting System (PSTS) became an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The goal of the ACTD was to integrate currently available, emerging preci-

sion signals collection and processing technology into an operational system that could undergo testing and transition to operational forces in the shortest feasible time. The last PSTS demonstration was in September of 1998. The days where SIGINT has no immediate use to targeters are gone.

The PSTS charter was to develop and demonstrate a near-real-time, precision geolocation, sensor-to-shooter capability using existing national and tactical SIGINT assets. Specifically, the goal was to integrate existing tactical and national SIGINT assets to provide battlefield operators with target locations more accurately than current systems could achieve operating independently. Moreover, the intelligence assets must achieve and disseminate more rapidly than they generally have in the past.

The ACT demonstration faced three major challenges. They were to—

- Integrate existing systems into a common targeting effort.
- Increase target location accuracy.
- Compress the targeting decide-detect-deliver cycle.

Integrating Tactical and National Assets

What are the existing assets? There are sensitive national collection assets. These are extremely valuable sources seldom used for tactical applications. The demonstration had to develop ways of cueing these assets, analyzing their electronic catch, developing it into targeting information, and transmitting the target data to the weaponers. These tasks posed conceptual, organizational, technical, and cultural challenges; they involved communications protocols, procedures, concepts of operation, and ways to share information without compromising it.

The tactical assets were obvious. The ONR focused on the Army's Guardrail, an elegant sensor suite mounted on a C-12 fixed wing aircraft (the military version of the familiar King Air). The Guardrail system is a corps-level asset that has been in place for more than ten years. It is well equipped as a SIGINT collection platform.

To link the tactical and the national assets, the ONR used existing national communications systems and the Tactical Related Applications (TRAP) broadcasting system. TRAP was attractive because it represented an existing way of disseminating significant electronic intelligence (ELINT) worldwide.

Under the ACTD concept of operations, Guardrail would acquire a signal and tip the national assets to tune in on the emission. The national assets' data would go to an existing processing center for analysis and transmit a precise target geolocation via TRAP back to the division. There it would reenter ordinary intelligence and fire support channels, eventually winding up as a fire mission for a cannon battery. It was simpler to conduct fusion and analysis at the strategic-level processing station than to move these functions into an S2 shop. There were, however, risks associated with this: it increased the complexity of the tactical communications problem and it did little to allay the battlefield operators' habitual suspicion of intelligence analysis. The demonstrations would determine whether this approach was feasible.

One also might wonder whether we could achieve the desired accuracy quickly enough to be useful. We expect most tactical targets to have a relatively short dwell time. Every potential enemy expects to be located because of their signals emissions, and the prudent ones take steps

to help minimize those risks. Typically, various forms of emission control and frequent displacements achieve security.

Emission control will only provide limited value: if they are not using their electronic assets for fear of losing them, it is almost as effective for us as if they had lost them. Eventually they will radiate, and when they do, we have a fair chance of detecting it. Frequent displacement is more difficult. It will take the enemy time to use their radars (for it is air defense (AD) and weapons-locating radars we are interested in finding and destroying) but they will make that time as short as possible—radiate and move. Whatever PSTS did would have to be quick.

What the Demonstration Showed

The results were encouraging. The ONR ran a series of demonstrations culminating in the September 1998 effort. The Light and Special Division Interim Sensor (LSDIS) (an AD radar) and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinders (a weapons-locating radar used for counterbattery purposes) simulated the threat radar systems. These systems participated courtesy of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) 2d Infantry Division, which also provided the tactical command and control links and the actual shooters—in this case the 2d Battalion 17th Field Artillery. The Guardrail came from the 3d Military Intelligence Battalion.

The first tests showed an ability, using existing SIGINT and communications systems, to acquire the emitters with an accuracy within 1000 meters. This is useful from an intelligence point of view, but fire support personnel need more precision. This improved to the point where the PSTS was giving the batteries target locations accurate enough to engage with cannons.




Figure 1. The PSTS Concept of Operation and a Depiction of the Agencies, Organizations, and Units that Operate in PSTS.

The speed was also impressive. The PSTS team hoped to break 15 minutes, and they did. The average time from a Guardrail tip to the TRAP dissemination of the target was under 12 minutes, and we anticipate being able to reduce it to six or seven minutes.

Observations and Lessons Learned

Operationally, the ACTD found that preplanned ELINT tasking is critical for routine operations. Assets are not always readily available, and many customers compete for SIGINT products. They are not difficult to obtain, but one must plan for them in tasking. The PSTS demonstration taught the lesson that intelligence personnel must work closely with their counterparts in fire support.

The demonstration also found that operator proficiency in the

Guardrail-associated systems was essential to timely targeting. The good news is that the operators can (and did) exhibit a high degree of proficiency, and that most training requirements are satisfied by Advanced QUICKLOOK training and missions.

Finally, on the operational side, we learned that collection management requires extensive cooperation and coordination. Both cooperation and coordination are always most difficult to achieve with new systems and across Service lines. However, the personnel who worked on the PSTS got it right even under those demanding conditions.

Technically, we saw the importance of PSTS collection times, when compared to the hostile emitter's on-off cycle. We also saw that the relative geometry of the cooperating collectors over time was

critical to achieving the accuracy desired. Finally, we saw that Guardrail's sensitivity suited it well to assume primary responsibility for tip-generation during PSTS Demonstration 5.

The Future of PSTS

Part of the future is already here. One of the nice things about Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations is that they traditionally leave behind a real operational capability. The prototypes did not all return to the labs, but some remained in place with USFK.

The future holds other challenges. Some of the challenges are straightforward. The ONR demonstrated the system with Guardrail. Now that the ACTD is complete and the system has been handed over to the Airborne Overhead Interoperability Office, the AOIO will seek to extend the capability to

other airborne platforms: the EP-3, Rivet Joint, and the U-2. Other issues the AOIO is researching include assessing how to best use the scarce Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) operators to receive TRAP broadcasts.

We also wish to extend the SIGINT capability from noncommunications emitters more broadly. When the AOIO succeeds in demonstrating the ability to target communications emitters, it will introduce an extremely important new capability.

The ONR has a winner in the PSTS; one we would not have without outstanding cooperation from the Army's intelligence community. Others believe it is a winner as well. Brigadier General Nicholas Grant, Director of Intelligence, USFK J2, called PSTS "a significant enhancement to the theater's collection capability."

Major General Robert W. Noonan, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, said,

The Precision SIGINT Targeting ACTD shows great promise for warfighters. It has laid the foundation in USFK that can now be migrated to other CINC AORs to build robust tactical-national ELINT targeting



U.S. Army photo.

The RC-12 Guardrail demonstrates its collaborative collection capability as part of PSTS.

capabilities. More importantly, it lays the foundation for a robust tactical-national COMINT targeting capability. When the community achieves COMINT targeting, the full potential of PSTS will be realized.

The best news is that all the Services now have a new and powerful targeting system available today in the Korean peninsula. Anyone interested in the system is invited to contact the ONR through its website, <http://www.onr.navy.mil>. To go directly to the PSTS web page, follow http://web.fie.com/w3get/www.onr.navy.mil:80/sci_tech/inter/psts.htm.

Lieutenant Commander Cooperwood enlisted in the Navy after high school and entered the Nuclear Power Program. Following his completion of nuclear power training, he boarded the USS California in where he completed a global circumnavigation. He received a Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps scholarship to the University of South Carolina, where he received a Bachelors of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Subsequently, he served as Electrical Officer and Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer aboard the USS Jouett, and then as Combat Information Center Officer aboard the USS Belleau Wood. He transferred to Engineering Duty and served as Ship Superintendent at SupShip in San Diego. LCDR Cooperwood earned a Masters of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School. Since then he has served as a Project Officer for the Link-6/TADIL (Tactical Digital Information Link) J Program Office and was instrumental in developing the extended range enhancement to Link-16 known as Satellite TADIL J. Since 1997, LCDR Cooperwood has been at the ONR where he currently serves as the PSTS ACTD Program Manager.


Major Petrik works for Noesis, Inc., a consulting firm based in Virginia, and supports the Office of Naval Research. A major in the United States Army Reserve, he served on active duty for twelve years in a variety of Field Artillery assignments, including an extended tour with V Corps Artillery in Germany and three years as Combat Trainer with the Fire Support Training Team at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. He holds a Bachelors degree from Middlebury College and a Masters degree from the University of Chicago, and has taught at both the United States Military Academy and Rockhurst College.



U.S. Navy photo.

Navy EP-3. The AOIO intends to extend the PSTS capability to the EP-3 Aries II.

The Aerial Exploitation Battalion at NTC: Aerial Intelligence Defines the



The first force-on-force battle began to take shape, a meeting battle between the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and an OPFOR Krasnovian Motorized Rifle Regiment. A Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) moving target indicator (MTI) display tracked the location of the two lead battalions of the 1st echelon as they approached Granite Pass. Additional unidentified Joint STARS MTI's began to appear in the north while the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) redirected to suspected trail elements deep in the BCT area of operations. As the Brigade S2 received an immediate Guardrail "combat information" report referencing a "call for fire" on friendly forces, an observer/controller (O/C) responded to a call received over his radio. *"They've got it right here in front of them (referring to the Joint STARS MTI display and UAV video feed over the battle staff map board).... They know what the OPFOR is doing."*

by Captain Guy M. Burrow

This past August, the 15th MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) deployed to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California with the 104th MI Battalion in support of the 4thBCT, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (4ID(M)). Short of the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE), the intelligence architecture for this rotation represented one of the largest ever sent to NTC. Of particular success was the combination of the 15th MI Battalion (AE) Hunter UAV and Improved Guardrail V (IGRV) with the Common Ground Station (CGS) providing Joint STARS MTI information. Together, these aerial intelligence systems validated their ability to rapidly develop and confirm the enemy situation, while demonstrating the future potential of the Guardrail Common Sensor II (GRCS II) to

complete the Force XXI "aerial intelligence" capability.

Intelligence Architecture

Normally a III Corps asset, the 15th MI Battalion (AE) adapted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support a brigade task force in an early entry scenario. With the 4ID(M) Analysis and Control Element (ACE) remaining in garrison at Fort Hood, Texas, the concept incorporated split-based and tactical tailoring concepts. The architecture for both the UAV and the IGRV platforms had to be flexible and redundant, especially the communications, in order to maximize the effectiveness of both systems in the 4BCT fight.

In addition to the 15th MI Battalion (AE) systems, the 104th MI Battalion's intelligence assets included the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), TRQ-32 TEAMMATE, TLQ-17 TRAFFICJAM, along with

the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT) II (TS II). The 104th MI Battalion also provided the personnel for the CGS, Analysis and Control Team (ACT), ACE, and the Ground Surveillance Operations Center (GSOC).

Guardrail Concept of Operations. The mission of Guardrail was to conduct communications intelligence (COMINT) collection and processing operations throughout the depth of the battlefield, focusing on the communications nets of enemy reconnaissance, maneuver, artillery, command and control (C²) and air defense artillery. Initially, the Guardrail Company was poised to support a maximum of two five-hour missions per day from Southern California International Airport (SCIA). By the last mission, Guardrail stood ready to support 24-hour continuous operations by maximizing pilot availabil-

ity and aircraft maintenance to support continuous relief on station.

The IGRV architecture called for the Collection Manager at the ACE to perform technical tasking and mission management based on 4BCT intelligence requirements received from the ACT via Mobile Subscriber Equipment/Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (MSE/NIPRNET). During mission execution, the analysts in the Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) processed raw intercepted COMINT data and issued technical reports on an ASAS Remote Workstation Version 1 (ASAS-RWSv1) to the ACE via TS II. The same capability existed at the GSOC, ensuring redundancy.

At Fort Hood, ACE soldiers analyzed the technical reports to produce a single-source (SS) picture of the enemy situation. After integrating the SS picture on the All-Source ASAS, the ASAS-RWS analyst updated the current enemy situation and posted the new dynamically digital distributed overlay (DDO) to the 52d ID ASAS-RWS in the "Star Wars Building" on Fort Irwin, California. After approval for release by an O/C, all ASAS-RWS users across the MSE network received the current enemy situation.

Due to the dynamic nature of the brigade tactical fight, the 15th MI Battalion (AE) developed a second, more responsive reporting procedure. As the IPF analysts detected critical "combat information," they sent SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) spot reports directly to the Tactical Commander's Terminal (TCT) at the 4BCT Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and the Improved Commander's Tactical Terminal (ICTT) at the GSOC.

Communications between the IPF, ACE, and the 4BCT TOC were critical due to the physical separation of all three unit locations (see Figure 1). Redundant communica-




Figure 1. Improved Guardrail V Concept of Operations.

tions supporting this architecture included: Digital Non-secure Voice Telephone (DNVT)/MSE/Dial Central Office (DCO) connectivity, TS II satellite communications, TCT secure voice ultrahigh frequency (UHF), and secure satellite communications (SATCOM) between the 4BCT TOC and the IPF. Perhaps the most critical link was the MSE network that allowed the only voice and digital link between the 4BCT TOC and the ACE. Without MSE, the ACE could not pass the updated enemy picture to the Brigade. Furthermore, the ACT could not transmit the priority intelligence re-

quirements (PIR) to the ACE, denying them the information needed to provide IPF operators with technical taskings prior to mission execution. In this scenario, IGRV intelligence would be limited to SALUTE reports directly to the 4BCT TOC via SATCOM or TCT.

Hunter Concept of Operations.

The mission of the Hunter UAV was to provide live video imagery to the ACT at the 4BCT TOC to confirm and identify critical enemy activity, location of high-payoff targets (HPTs), and the disposition of obstacles. The Brigade S2 directed UAV coverage times and collection

Figure 1 Acronyms and Terms

| | |
|------------|--|
| AC pallets | Aircraft pallets |
| ACE | Analysis and control element |
| AGE | Auxiliary Ground Equipment Van |
| ASAS | All-Source Analysis System |
| ASAS-AS | ASAS-All Source |
| ASAS-RWS | ASAS Remote Workstation |
| ASAS-SS | ASAS Single Source |
| CCS | Communications control set |
| CDR | Commander |
| CGS | Common Ground Station |
| DCO | Dial Central Office |
| Det | Detachment |
| DNVT | Digital Nonsecure Voice Telephone |
| EXT | Extinguishers |
| FM | Frequency modulation |
| GEN | Generator |
| GPU | Ground Power Unit |
| HEMTT | Heavy Expanded-Mobility Tactical Truck |

| | |
|-------------|---|
| IGRV | Improved Guardrail V |
| IPF | Integrated Processing Facility |
| MSE | Mobile Subscriber Equipment |
| NIPRNET | Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network |
| O2 cart | Oxygen cart |
| PDS trailer | Power distribution system trailer |
| RWS | Remote workstation |
| SATCOM | Satellite communications |
| SIGO | Signals Officer |
| SPIRIT | Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal |
| STE | Special test equipment |
| TCC | Tactical Commanders Communication |
| TCT | Tactical Commanders Terminal |
| TOC | Tactical operations center |
| TTY | Tactical teletype (aircraft tug) |
| TUG | Vehicle |
| VEH | Vehicle |

Figure 2 Acronyms and Terms

| | |
|-------------|------------------------------|
| B/U general | Backup generator |
| FLO VEH | Flight-Line Operator vehicle |
| GDT | Ground data terminal (UAV) |
| ISU-90 | Individual storage unit |
| km | Kilometer |
| MOGAS | Motor gasoline |
| MPS | Mission Planning Shelter |
| MPU | Mobile power unit |
| MSL | Mean sea level |
| O/C radio | Observer/Controller radio |
| RETRANS | Retransmit |
| RVT | Remote video terminal |
| TECH TRLR | Technician trailer |
| UAV | Unmanned aerial vehicle |

Figure 3. Expansion of acronyms used in figures.

confirmed and tracked the two lead battalions of the OPFOR 1st echelon, followed by trail elements of the main body. The UAV maintained a broad focus throughout the mission; however, the impact of the live UAV feed coupled with the Joint STARS MTI display was obvious, allowing a real-time intelligence picture for the 4BCT battle staff.

The IGRV architecture received a major setback as the MSE network failed to become operational, and would remain down for the majority of the force-on-force phase. With the link between the ACT and the ACE broken, the ACE was not able to produce technical taskings for the IPF operators. Furthermore, IGRV intelligence from the IPF was restricted to voice-transmitted SALUTE reports directly to the 15th MI Battalion (AE) Liaison Officer (LNO) at the 4BCT TOC.

To overcome this obstacle, IPF operators conducted an environmental signal survey, establishing echelon, then type of unit. The operators then developed their own technical taskings based on PIR received directly from the 15th MI Battalion (AE) LNO. After performing normal COMINT intercept and direction-finding (DF) operations, the IPF soldiers conducted hasty analysis of the information to gen-

erate the final SALUTE reports. Once the ACT received the reports, they incorporated the information into their ASAS-RWS enemy picture and forwarded critical information to the Brigade S2. Guardrail sent 15 "combat information" reports to include an enemy call-for-fire on friendly units. While the effectiveness of the Guardrail system was limited, the truly dedicated efforts of the soldiers in the IPF ensured the best possible support given the circumstances. The IPF operators had set the stage for success during the follow-on missions.

Defense. The next force-on-force mission saw continued development of UAV, IGRV, and Joint STARS intelligence. During the Defense, UAV and Joint STARS displays provided an almost complete picture of the OPFOR's location and movement. The battle staff had begun to rely on these two platforms, and fought the "intelligence" battle based on their information. As a result, an OPFOR MRB was able to move almost undetected, using terrain masking in the northern areas of the maneuver corridor, where the Joint STARS MTI capabilities were limited.

In review of the Guardrail reports received during this mission, the 15th MI Battalion LNO at the 4BCT

TOC recorded three separate SALUTE reports of a suspected MRB conducting a flanking maneuver to the north. Unfortunately, due to the dynamic and sometimes overwhelming nature of operations at NTC, these reports never found their way into the battle staff picture of the enemy. While the UAV and Joint STARS systems provided a substantial enemy picture, IGRV provided the intelligence needed to complete the situation for the battle staff.

Mission Accomplishments.

The force-on-force phase of operations saw the UAV identify hide and ambush sites, track important enemy units, and identify truck-mobile infiltration units. UAV imagery generated numerous calls-for-fire and cued aviation assets to HPTs. L/R efforts at Bike Lake, under sometimes extreme environmental conditions, provided maximum UAV coverage within the NTC rules of engagement, logging more than 100 flight hours in support of the 4BCT.

After initial communication difficulties, Guardrail reports quickly became more focused and limited only by the speed of SATCOM and TCT transmissions. By the last battle of the Deliberate Attack, the ICTT moved from the GSOC to the 4BCT TOC, allowing printed re-

ports to go directly to the ACT and Brigade S2. IPF SALUTE reports identified the location of essential C² nets and HPTs leading to numerous calls-for-fire during the last two battles. The RC-12D aircraft mission hours totaled more than 230 over the 10-day period. Most importantly, the outstanding efforts of the IPF operators ensured that Guardrail intelligence was effective throughout the battle.

The Keys to Success

UAV TTP Familiarization. While the Joint STARS display provided an excellent picture of the brigade battlespace, the live UAV video feed often lured staff members to dictate the focus of the UAV. At one point, the UAV tracked a single vehicle for almost 45 minutes. During these instances, control of the UAV decentralized, taking away a valuable tool from the ACT to verify MTIs from Joint STARS as well as other intelligence cues. Only with a battle staff trained and familiar with the TTP for UAV usage can we realize the full impact of the UAV.

Communications. Voice and digital communications proved difficult, yet critical to mission accomplishment. The first focus of

any operation should be communications, which must be operational before deployment into a field environment. The effectiveness of aerial intelligence platforms relies heavily on voice and digital communications for coordination and intelligence dissemination. While communications were limited, the redundancy of the architecture ensured overall mission accomplishment for the 15th MI Battalion (AE).

IGRV and the ACE. The complete success of the IGRV platform still hinges on the capability of the ACE to provide information to the IPF, receive reports from the operators, and send an analyzed product to the end-user. In the digital information age, handwritten SALUTE reports cannot maximize the utility of the vast Guardrail capability. The IPF operators are far from the tactical battle and must have both the friendly and enemy situation information in order to properly focus their collection efforts. During the rotation, the ACE soldiers overcame the initial communications difficulties and were able to answer much needed requests for information from the IPF operators, greatly enhancing

the effectiveness of the IGRV support.

Future Applications

With an eye toward force modernization, the fielding of the GRCS II (scheduled for late 1999) will further enhance the impact of Guardrail-derived information. This system will provide signals intelligence (SIGINT) directly to the CGS. As with the MTI from Joint STARS, GRCS II targets will appear on the CGS display, greatly reducing the dependence on MSE to relay the Guardrail picture. The addition of the GRCS II will permit a more complete and redundant picture of the battlefield, cross-cueing and verifying Joint STARS and UAV information. If the CGS monitor had displayed the Guardrail DF information during the Defense mission, it would have alerted the 4BCT battle staff to the presence of the MRB in the north, possibly changing the mission outcome.

Conclusion

The result of NTC rotation 98-10 again established the effectiveness and verified the need for the UAV, Guardrail, and Joint STARS aerial intelligence platforms. With the CGS receiving reports from both Joint STARS and the GRCS II, coupled with UAV imagery, three separate intelligence mediums will combine to produce a dynamic, relevant, and complete battlefield picture for the Force XXI commander. In an effort to dominate the information requirements of the future, Military Intelligence depends on the continued development and success of these systems.

Captain Matt Burrow commands Bravo Company and was a Battalion Plans and Operations Officer at the 15th MI Battalion (AE). His previous duty positions include Executive Officer and Platoon Leader in a Theater General Support Aviation Company. CPT Burrow is a graduate of the United States Military Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering. Readers can contact him at (254) 287-7854, DSN 737-7854, or via E-mail at burrowg@hood-emh3.army.mil.

Photo courtesy of the U.S.



The UAV Ground Control Station (left) and the CGS at the 4th BCT TOC.

LETTERS

To the Editor:

I believe Major Girard significantly overstates his case for the current existence of "advanced automatic translators" in his article, "Cradle-to-Grave Interrogator Training Using and Embedded AI Device, in the July-September 1998 *MI Professional Bulletin*. Machine translation (MT) certainly exists today. It is, however, hardly advanced and certainly not near the native proficiency level. MT is an excellent tool and should be integrated into far more of our jobs than the current FALCON document translator.

I enjoyed Major Girard's article and applaud his concept. The need for, and perhaps the ultimate availability

of, a virtual reality training device is well stated. I do not believe the enormous technical problems inherent in Major Girard's device will be solved in the near term.

Native-level translation, while an admirable goal, is beyond the ability of current, or near-term programs and computers. Anything less than native level does our soldiers a disservice and teaches them the wrong lessons.

Ray Lane Aldrich

Department of Army Foreign Language Proponency Office
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor:

I just finished reading Major Jeffrey Girard's article. While I agree whole-

heartedly that the latest technologies will be a great supplement to interrogator training, the idea of phasing out one-on-one interrogation training between an instructor and student is short-sighted at best. We cannot eliminate the language requirement for interrogators; it is probably the best training an interrogator receives in understanding the cultural nuances of a potential EPW, thus making for a stronger interrogation.

Interrogation is an art, not a science. Only through numerous contacts with people can interrogators hone their skills. Virtual Reality is no substitute for a live body.

Thomas W. Mann
Salem, Oregon

PROFESSIONAL READER

Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War by Mark Bowden (NY: Monthly Press, Atlantic 1999), 386 pages.

Black Hawk Down will take its place on the bookshelf along the other great battle accounts such as **We Were Soldiers Once and Young** and **A Bridge Too Far**. The incredibly vivid and detailed descriptions, related directly to the author by the men on the ground, are riveting. The book is impossible to put down—Mark Bowden clearly has a gift for talking to soldiers and translating their verbal accounts to the written word. Bowden not only endeavored to interview as many Delta Force and Task Force Ranger personnel as possible, but also visited Mogadishu and recorded the Somali recollection of the fight as well.

Bowden sheds light on an operation cloaked in secrecy by the military and hushed away by politicians. While he describes the battle as the most in-

tense hand-to-hand fighting by U.S. troops since the Vietnam War, the U.S. media hardly addressed it and most Americans are still unaware of the sacrifices made. The units involved hindered press coverage: Special Operations Command (SOCOM) missions involving the 75th Ranger Regiment and the Delta Force do not invite public scrutiny. The author highlights the capabilities, personalities and differing philosophies of these organizations, providing an unprecedented glimpse into these units. The author addresses every echelon, from the generals running the entire Somali peacekeeping operation to the Privates engaged in combat. Individual acts of heroism—from the company clerk who rushed out to fight alongside his buddies, to the sacrifice of Delta Force snipers Randy Shughart and Gary Gordon, to the ordeal of helicopter pilot Mike Durant—finally receives the coverage they rightfully deserve.

This book is valuable for much more than the realistic account. Soldiers, of-

ficers, politicians, and foreign policy professionals can all learn from this brutal engagement. The author proclaims the Battle of Mogadishu as a case study for 21st century operations. Indeed, **Black Hawk Down** should be required reading for military officers and civilian policy-makers at every echelon. Players at every level learned painful lessons. Small-unit leaders relearned the value of a standard combat load as soldiers prepared for a short-duration daylight operation and remained in an engagement that lasted through the night and into the next morning, without night-vision devices or adequate water. The debate will continue at the operational level about the absence of armored vehicles in the force package, but after the perceived debacle of Mogadishu, the first forces into the urban and mountainous Bosnia were armored. The most valuable lesson of all is for our policy-makers—do not commit forces to an operation un-

the ultimate price. Eighteen soldiers lost their lives in the streets of Mogadishu, and the reaction of the U.S. Government was to withdraw.

Bowden's account is non-biased and objective. He saves his own opinions on the operation for the Epilogue, where he makes it clear that he is only commenting on the perceptions of the personnel he interviewed, as he lacks the military experience to critique the operation. However, the author leaves no doubt as to the true heroes of Mogadishu: our soldiers.

First Lieutenant Jarrett Schulz
Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Honor by Fire: Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific by Lyn Crost (Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994). 368 pages. \$24.95

On September 2, 1945, General MacArthur accepted the formal surrender of the Japanese Empire aboard the battleship USS Missouri. Along with officials from the warring countries, Lieutenants Sakamoto, Yoshimura, and Yokoyama were present to witness the event. The lieutenants were military intelligence service veterans of the war in the Pacific. They were also second generation Americans of Japanese decent, Nisei.

For those too young to remember World War II, there is nothing startling about Nisei being at the surrender ceremony. Why wouldn't Americans who understood the Japanese language and culture be there? In *Honor by Fire*, Lyn Crost explains the "why" as she records the history and personal experiences of Nisei soldiers of the 100th Infantry Battalion/442d Regimental Combat Team and the Military Intelligence Service. She describes how fear and racism compelled the President to sign Executive Order 9066 singling out Americans of Japanese decent as a threat to national security. The order authorized the relocation of over 120,000 Americans and resident aliens from the West Coast to internment camps. The order also classified all draft age Nisei as 4-C (enemy aliens), initially denying some of America's best assault troops and linguists the opportunity to fight for their country.

Many know of the achievements of the 100th/442d Regimental Combat

Team, the most decorated unit of its size during World War II. Few, however, know the role Nisei played in military intelligence. Crost puts names to deeds as she traces the contribution of Nisei to winning the war in the Pacific. She describes the Philippine exploits of future Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame selectee Richard Sakakida. She tells how, despite being mortally wounded, Sergeant Frank Hachiya delivered critical information gathered from enemy prisoners and earned the Silver Star. These are but two of the many personal stories about the unsung military intelligence soldiers that Crost brings to life in *Honor by Fire*.

I believe this book is important. *Honor by Fire* is more than an account of Nisei soldiers in battle. It is a testimony to the faith and devotion of Americans to their country. It reminds us that we are Americans based not on race, color, or religion but on our way of life, values, and democratic ideals. Though as a nation we may stumble along the road to the American dream, this book reminds us why it remains a road worth defending.

SFC Michael C. Taylor
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass by J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers West, 1997). 151 pages

The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass, is a short, well-organized book about an area of military history with which most Americans are not well-acquainted. The Maginot Line, the line of fortresses France built along her borders in the 1920s and 1930s to deter invasion, has long since become a part of the 20th century's military mythology. You hear the name, or perhaps drive past one of the forts (nearly all in ruins), and you think of the story of the German invasion that happened despite the vast network of French defenses. However, most of us, if pressed, do not know much about the Maginot Line at all. Part of the reason most of us do not know much about the Maginot Line is that little is written about it, at least in English. With *The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass*, J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann present a

well-researched introduction to the famous French border defenses of the pre-war period. It is a worthwhile read for those who are curious about the subject, or for someone who has a professional reason to become better informed about recent European history.

The Maginot Line, in the version of the story that most of us know, was a huge edifice intended to prevent a foreign army from invading France, and whose construction and operation consumed the resources of the French Army before World War II. When war came, the story goes, the German Wehrmacht easily routed or penetrated the Maginot Line and invaded France. The authors argue that this version of events is wrong, at least in part. The Kaufmanns contend that the Maginot Line was successful in its original mission, but that the mission had changed by the time the war began, and that the frontier defenses were not able to support the new mission—one for which they had never been intended.

As explained in this book, the French military's doctrine changed during the years in which the Maginot Line was built. As budgets and the term of draftees' service shrank, it seemed to make sense to rely more for territorial defense on the strength of the Maginot Line's fortresses than on divisions in the field. By the time the German invasion came, French doctrine relied far more on the forts' fixed defenses than their designers had intended. The French leadership was proven horribly wrong about the Ardennes, and the mighty fortresses of the Maginot Line did not engage their German foes until the war was weeks old. The Maginot Line's fortresses fought very well in these battles, the authors say, but they had been intended to fight in concert with large and mobile divisions, division which were not available. The forts could delay German movement into France, but could not prevent it.

This book is well-researched, and contains as much detail on specific weapons and protection as could be desired. There is comparatively little to be found about the men who worked in the Maginot Line's forts. A large collection of line drawings is helpful in picturing how the forts were laid out, but photographs would have been useful, too.

Major Christopher Hilliard
LANDCENT EX TEAM, Germany

CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE

Defining CI and HUMINT Requirements

by Chief Warrant Officer Four
Patrick J. Foxen

For the purpose of this article, we refer to human intelligence (HUMINT) specifically as the "collection of information for intelligence purposes from humans." While there are obviously other human sources of information on the battlefield (e.g., scouts and long-range surveillance teams), they are beyond the scope of this article.

During recent stability operations and support operations, the Army has placed a growing emphasis on collecting information for intelligence purposes from the local population. To keep in step with this growing emphasis, our division is assessing our current doctrine on human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) operations. Our first step is to develop the Combat Commander's Handbook on HUMINT and CI Operations in Stability Operations and Support Operations this spring. We then plan to revise **FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation** (possibly retitled **HUMINT Collection**), and **FM 34-60, Counterintelligence**, beginning this fall and winter. As we begin this challenge, we need your input. To start, we would like specific thoughts and comments on this article.

CI Does Not Equal HUMINT

Across DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leadership, materiel, and soldiers), there is a tendency to blur the distinction between two very distinct doctrinal requirements, HUMINT and CI. **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, describes HUMINT as one of the four intelligence disci-

plines and CI as one of the two multidiscipline functions. There is a tendency to confuse the methodology on information collection and operational intention. This imprecise use and mixing of doctrinal terminology is bound to weaken both the HUMINT and CI efforts. While HUMINT and CI are highly complementary efforts, even symbiotic, the basic mindsets of both are diametrically opposite by definition. CI is not a subset of HUMINT.

HUMINT is the intelligence derived from information collected from people and related documents. HUMINT is a pure collection discipline and is an essential contributor to the all-source picture of the battlefield. By a "pure" collection discipline, we mean that the purpose of the discipline is to collect information from a specific type of source using a specific skill set. The purpose of and requirement for the collection of this information is irrelevant. That is not to suggest that no one evaluates and analyzes the information. The HUMINT collector responds to command and national collection requirements regardless of the intended use of that information.

CI, on the other hand, is a multidiscipline function whose purpose is to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, or exploit the intelligence collection efforts of competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies. It is the critical means the intelligence community uses to protect the force against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination when the activity is conducted for, or on behalf of, foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist groups. The defining factor in CI operations is not how

we collect the information but the purpose of collection. CI agents use HUMINT collection techniques in some aspects of their collection and investigative mission. It is this use of HUMINT skills, particularly in its investigative and source operation roles that has led to confusion.

How Did We Get Here?

How then did this trend to associate CI solely with HUMINT collection and to define HUMINT entirely in CI or force protection terms develop? Two factors have contributed to this trend: insufficient resources and ill-defined mission requirements.

Insufficient Resources. Many recent operations (e.g., Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia) have been against a relatively unsophisticated foe technologically, but conducted in an environment that is rich in HUMINT collection potential. The forces that we deployed often have lacked the HUMINT capability to meet the collection opportunities. The lack of HUMINT collectors has led to the use of CI agents to perform a primary HUMINT collection job. This creates problems in two areas. First, because they are credentialed CI agents, there are restrictions that apply to CI agents but do not apply to HUMINT collectors (such as CI agents' use in criminal investigations). Second, when using a CI agent as your HUMINT collector, you are not employing the best tool for the job. The tendency to define military occupational specialty 97E (Interrogator) and to a lesser degree 351E (Human Intelligence Collection Technician) as simply "interrogators" compounds this problem. This narrow focus coupled with a misunderstanding of the term "in-

terrogator" (see the definitions below) has led to a hesitancy to use these personnel.

Poorly Defined Mission Requirements. Our experiences in Bosnia and Somalia, coupled with our need to minimize casualties, have led us to define collection requirements solely in the terms of force protection and hence as CI. First, this is a misnomer, since CI does not equate to force protection and secondly, it ignores the "positive" collection capabilities of HUMINT. CI concerns itself with the threat's collection capability not necessarily with an analysis of other threat capabilities and plans. The identification of the threat's organizational structure, capabilities, and plans is a part of HUMINT collection. There is also a tendency to define CI strictly in the terms of HUMINT collection and ignore other "adversary" collection capabilities (e.g. computer penetration). Although some CI agents receive training in this area, most do not.

So what is the solution to this problem? We must clearly define the sets of doctrinal requirements currently needed to meet the HUMINT collection mission and the CI mission. The rest of this article proposes some important doctrinal terms necessary to describe HUMINT collection, CI analysis, and CI investigations.

HUMINT Collection Activities

HUMINT collection includes "operations conducted using HUMINT collection techniques regardless of the ultimate use of that information." HUMINT activities include a great variety of operations, analysis, and liaison duties.

CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO). Tactically-oriented, overt collection program that uses human sources (informants) on the battlefield to identify potential and actual threats to deployed U.S. and coalition forces and to answer intelligence require-

ments. Sources can provide early warning of imminent danger to deployed U.S. and coalition forces and provide information that helps in the decision-making process.

Liaison. Liaison is the gaining of rapport with and elicitation of information from host country and allied military and civilian agencies. Agents conduct liaison with host nation military and law enforcement U.S., coalition, and host nation law enforcement and security personnel. Liaison can answer collection requirements, coordinate activities, and foster cooperation.

Document Exploitation (DOCEX). The systematic extraction of information from documents to aid in HUMINT collection operations and to obtain information in response to collection requirements.

Surveillance. Observation of a facility, activity, or individuals to answer collection requirements, support the commander's decision-making processes, or support a CI program.

Screening Operations. Operations to identify sources that may be able to answer collection requirements, serve as CFSO sources, or be a part of a base or area security program. This operation is both a tactical HUMINT and CI operation. Screening operations include:

- Mobile and static checkpoints (e.g., refugee or displaced persons).
- Part of a cordon and search operation.
- Locally employed personnel security.
- Enemy prisoner of war and detainee.

Interrogation and Detainee Operations. The systematic questioning of large numbers of enemy prisoners of war or detainees in response to collection requirements. This usually occurs at a military police- or other agency-operated collection facility.

Friendly Force Debriefing Operations. The systematic debriefing of U.S. Forces to answer collection requirements.

Refugee Debriefing Operations are the systematic debriefing of refugees and displaced persons to answer collection requirements.

Single-Source HUMINT Analysis. The analysis of information obtained from HUMINT operations listed above.

HUMINT Collection Procedures and Techniques

Debriefing is the systematic effort to obtain information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person not in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. The two primary categories of sources for debriefing are U.S. and foreign personnel. The U.S. personnel include patrols, military personnel who have been in contact with host nation personnel, and U.S. businesspersons who may have worked in the areas of interest. Refugees, local inhabitants, and members of non-governmental organizations are examples of the foreign personnel who may be sources.

Interrogation is the effort to acquire information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. Some examples of interrogation sources are enemy prisoners of war and detainees.

Elicitation is the direct interaction with a human source to gain information where the source is not aware of the specific purpose for the conversation. Elicitation is the baseline method for initiating source operations.

Screening encompasses the techniques used to identify an individual for further exploitation or investigation. Discriminators used in screening can range from general

appearance and attitude to specific questions to assess areas of knowledge and degree of cooperation. You must remember that screening is not an intelligence collection technique (in itself). It is a timesaving measure that identifies those individuals most likely to answer an intelligence or CI requirement.

CI Analysis and Support Operations

Multidiscipline CI (MDCI) Analysis is the analysis of the threat's signals intelligence (SIGINT), HUMINT, and imagery intelligence (IMINT) capabilities regarding intelligence collection, terrorism, and sabotage to develop countermeasures against them. It involves a reverse intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process in which the analyst looks at U.S. forces and operations from the threat perspective to assist in friendly courses of action (COAs) development. This analytical tool supports the commander's force protection program and facilitates the nomination of CI targets for neutralization or exploitation.

CI Support to Threat Vulnerability Assessments provides an assessment of a command or facility's susceptibility to foreign intelligence

collection. Most assessments also evaluate threats from terrorist and insurgent groups, as well as susceptibility to sabotage.

HUMINT and CI support to force protection. A commander's force protection program encompasses many assets designed to help protect the force. HUMINT and CI can use their unique protective and collection capabilities to help a commander safeguard a deployed force.

CI Investigation Operations are those operations requiring CI certification (i.e., counterintelligence agents with badge and credentials).

CI Investigations. CI agents train to conduct investigations into breaches of national security. The average tactical HUMINT and CI team will not spend a great amount of time conducting CI investigations, and will require assistance from operational and strategic CI assets to perform more than basic CI investigations. The areas of CI investigation include espionage, terrorism, treason, subversion, sedition, and automated information systems intrusion.

CI Technical Support. CI elements from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) bring some valuable

technical capabilities to a contingency area, to include Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) capabilities and polygraph support.

Conclusion

HUMINT collection and CI are and will continue to become increasingly important as we enter the 21st century. Both efforts are vital to mission success across the entire spectrum of operations. The understanding of the doctrinal distinction between HUMINT collection and CI is fundamental. This distinction drives the doctrinal description of both efforts and our understanding of how they are mutually supportive and intertwined in stability operations and support operations. As we grapple with this issue, we need your input.

Editor's Note: Look for the July-September 1999 issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, which will feature several articles relating to HUMINT and CI.

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Closing the Intelligence Gap in the OMFTS Concept

(Continued from page 35)

-tems to support and then rapidly disseminate their analysis. Additionally, some of the superb intelligence systems coming online, including the Joint STARS CGS, the Joint Tactical UAV (or an acceptable maritime vertical-takeoff-and-landing equivalent) and any of the HUMINT automation tools currently under development must be fielded to MAGTF level sooner rather than later. Empowering commanders with these capabilities will go far in providing a common understanding of the threat

within a deployed MAGTF's battlespace.

The Marine Corps must invest in intelligence systems and field them to MAGTF level now. Intelligence systems often do not appeal to the combat commander or the "budgeteer," because these systems do not fire precision-guided munitions or carry combat-laden marines or soldiers into the fight. Intelligence can, however, make a decisive contribution if doctrine and acquisition strategies receive priority. Relegating intelligence to a back seat at the OMFTS/STOM table will greatly weaken a superb

concept for warfighting in the 21st century.

Major "Skip" Jones is an Army intelligence officer currently attending the U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). Before his assignment at Quantico, he served as the Military Assistant to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at the Pentagon. MAJ Jones has served as a Maneuver Brigade S2 and MI Company Commander in the 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Public Relations from the University of Georgia and a Master of Science degree in Personnel Management from Chapman College. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at joneshe@mcu.usmc.mil.

TRADOC System Manager All-Source Analysis System

by Colonel Jerry V. Proctor

The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), the "Military Intelligence flagship system," has a whole series of firsts associated with it. As the first Army Battlefield Control System (ABCS) fully fielded and the most mature system, it has a lot about which to brag. However, when the first is associated with software, being first wears thin quickly and the being newer takes on more meaning. Yes, ASAS was first in fielding. However it now is getting older and in need of an upgrade. TEAM ASAS is doing just that. The most visible upgrade activity is the testing of the new Block II Remote Workstation (RWS).

This new RWS will bear little resemblance to its Block I predecessor. The new high-powered Common Hardware and Software (CHS) II Ultra Computing Unit processors will host the new RWS. It will have a Windows NT® look and feel. It will do elementary correlation, very powerful database functions (using Oracle™, and soon will be fully interoperable with Modernized Intelligence Database (MIDB). It will have some collection management functionality, be able to work with the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) systems, and will have expanded graphics capabilities. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (4ID(M)), the test unit, likes the system very much. Additionally, it will have all ABCS common upgrades such as:

- Common maps and a common mapping tool.

- Shared databases.
- Database exchange message-based exchange.
- Much better graphics and planning functions.
- The ability to easily share products and data among all ABCS systems.

The MIDB makes it fully joint.

In order to get this very capable new RWS to the field as soon as possible, TEAM ASAS planned, and conducted the first operational test of an Army Category 1 (highest priority acquisition) system during a full corps Warfighter exercise. In the past, there were two absolute rules regarding operational tests and Warfighters. First, we only conduct operational tests in isolated, fully controlled test environments where the testers, evaluators, and data collectors can trace a digit from inception to completion. This is so that we can specifically trace any faults of the system. Unless we can completely control the environment, there can be no operational test. The second rule is that no commander can allow the addition of any internal event to a Warfighter exercise. Warfighters are the ultimate graded event for a major unit. To add complexity (such as an operational test) on top of an already high adventure event only makes the situation more difficult.

ASAS violated both rules. With great cooperation from the testing and evaluation community, TEAM ASAS coordinated to conduct its operational test for the RWS during a Warfighter. The designated test

unit, 4ID(M) had too many other commitments so the most logical time and place to conduct the test was during the Warfighter. With tremendous hard work and exemplary cooperation from all, the ASAS RWS conducted its operational test during the December 1998 III Corps Warfighter exercise.

We could not meet all the test requirements with this event. We will conduct a second scaled-down, brigade-only stand-alone test in March to finish all the test requirements. However, the first operational test was a superior success. The fine soldiers and leaders of the 4ID(M) performed magnificently and the entire MI community owes them a debt of gratitude for their outstanding performance.

The test results are not in yet and it would be premature to predict the results. However, ASAS provided a service to all ABCS systems by being the first to conduct a test this way, which clearly is the way of the future. Another blue ribbon for ASAS!

For more information about the RWS and the operational test, please contact us at the address below. You can also visit the TSM ASAS web page <http://www.tsm.asas.army.mil>.

Colonel Jerry Proctor is the TSM ASAS and the Deputy TSM is Mr. Michael Strack. Readers can E-mail them at proctorj1@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and strackm@huachuca-emh1.army.mil. You can reach them telephonically at (520) 533-3504/7 or DSN 821-3504/7.

TRADOC System Manager Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and Aerial Common Sensor

by Colonel William M. Knarr, Jr.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems

The Close-Range Tactical UAV (CR-TUAV) is a ground maneuver-brigade commander's UAV...as a command and control enabler for tactical decision-making, it [the UAV] is the commander's "dominant eye," it allows him to shape the Army XXI battlefield to ensure mission success.

—CR-TUAV Operational Requirements Document (ORD), 25 February 1999

On 16 October 1998, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Chief of Staff, Major General Charles W. Thomas, approved the establishment of a Tier One integrated concept team (ICT) for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The primary purpose for the ICT is to coordinate UAV development and missions and UAV payloads. The ICT process will capitalize on the intense community interest in UAVs and the "smorgasbord" of payloads that are readily adaptable to a UAV. The final draft ICT charter, currently under review, will be available in late February. My goal is to forward the membership-approved final version to TRADOC by early March.

The ORD is undergoing review at the Joint Staff and in the theaters. In March, we expect an acquisition decision by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) to either continue with Outrider or pursue a flyoff against the CR-TUAV requirements. You may recall that Outrider participated in a 26-month Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) concluding on 30 June 1998 with a military utility assessment. A number of lessons learned from the program helped us refine the CR-TUAV ORD.

In December 1998, I had an opportunity to brief the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, on the placement of a Hunter Short-Range Tactical UAV

system at a combat training center (CTC). In November 1998, he asked TRADOC for a recommendation on whether the Army should field a Hunter system to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, or to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. After briefing Major General Charles Thomas and General Creighton Abrams, we met with General Reimer and representatives from the Department of the Army (DA) staff and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and recommended that we field the system to JRTC.

The primary purpose of fielding the Hunter system to JRTC is to train the force on UAVs. As you probably know, the 15th Military Intelligence Battalion has been extremely successful providing UAV support to the mechanized forces at Fort Hood and NTC. As an alternative to NTC, JRTC offers a number of benefits. JRTC supports training in a low- to mid-intensity conflict scenario. As such, it provides an alternative mission and terrain environment to support the development of UAV tactics, techniques, and procedures. This initiative positions UAVs to support light forces, the Strike Force, mission rehearsal exercises, and the upcoming Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment. Additionally, it offers UAV operators an assignment opportunity other than Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and Fort Hood, Texas. General Reimer approved the recommendation to field a system to JRTC. The UAV system will be operational to support brigade-level operations in June of this year.

Manned Airborne Reconnaissance Systems

We are now beginning the transition of current systems into a single

flexible and modular system that will be critical to providing information dominance in Force XXI and beyond—the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). At the end of 1994, we retired the last Guardrail V system from the inventory after more than 15 years of service. The Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) System 1, which brought a precision signals intelligence (SIGINT) targeting capability to XVIII Corps for the first time, replaced the Guardrail V. The same year saw the Crazy Horse system transferred from the active force to the Reserve Component after ten years of continuous service in Central and South America. In 1996, we replaced the last of the 30-year-old Mohawk aircraft in Korea with the Airborne Reconnaissance Low-Multifunction (ARL-M) aircraft equipped with moving target indicator (MTI) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Three ARL-M aircraft of the 3d MI Battalion, 501st MI Brigade, are now providing the same support in Korea previously provided by Mohawks.

In 1999, we will field two additional ARL-M aircraft to the 204th MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade. This will make the 204th much more capable of meeting its wide variety of missions in support of U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Central Command. These ARL-M systems will bring the MTI/SAR radar capability, advanced electro-optical imaging systems, and the Superhawk airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) system to the 204th for the first time. The imagery-only ARL-I aircraft, currently located with the 204th, will then begin an upgrade to ARL-M configuration that will be complete in fiscal year 2000 (FY00). We will upgrade the ARL-M aircraft in Korea in 1999 by adding a Tactical Common Datalink (TCDL).

This capability will allow them to downlink the entire radar picture into the 3d MI Battalion's GRCS Integrated Processing Facility for cross-cueing with the GRCS system.

The most exciting development on the horizon in the GRCS arena is the upcoming fielding of GRCS System 2. The Project Manager, Aerial Common Sensor (PM ACS) recently took conditional delivery of the system, and is now doing the final integration of some advanced capabilities. When delivered to III Corps in 3Q FY00, this system will replace the 15th MI Battalion's current Improved Guardrail V system. The GRCS System 2 is the world's most sophisticated airborne SIGINT system. It will provide a precision SIGINT targeting capability to III Corps for the first time. It will also provide a direct aircraft-to-satellite relay (DASR) capability that will eliminate the requirement for any type of ground processing or relay station in the forward area.

The fielded GRCS Systems will also receive a number of upgrades in 1999. We are beginning a transition away from the "mobile field station" architecture based on

40-foot vans, and moving toward a HMMWV- (high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle) based architecture that is more mobile and scaleable. The first step was the fielding of a HMMWV shelter with the capability to interoperate with selected joint service airborne SIGINT systems. This capability went to the 1st MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, in 1998; its scheduled fielding to Korea and to FORSCOM is in 1999. The second step is to field a HMMWV-based shelter to replace the existing communications and reporting equipment. Beginning in 1999, we will field three of these shelters to the fielded GRCS systems in Europe, Korea, and FORSCOM. The final step is to replace completely the existing Integrated Processing Facilities (IPFs) with a set of HMMWV-based shelters known as a Mini-IPF.

In cooperation with U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and leveraging technology and funding from the Precision SIGINT Targeting ACTD, PM ACS is now integrating hardware into an S-280 shelter that will serve as a test bed for the mini-IPF concept. One of the two mini-IPFs scheduled for completion in FY00

will eventually replace this hardware, known as the Guardrail Relay Facility (GRF).

All of these upgrades are stepping stones toward our future integrated airborne reconnaissance system—Aerial Common Sensor. The ORD for this system gained approval in October 1997. We are now working with a variety of agencies on a study to determine the best way to integrate existing and emerging technology into a system that will provide the correct mix of manned and unmanned platforms linked to the future Army ground-based processing architecture. The ACS system will be interoperable with other intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets at all echelons, and comply with the emerging Distributed Common Ground Stations (DCGS) and Unified Cryptologic Architecture (UCA) standards. Capitalizing on the successes of GRCS and ARL, Aerial Common Sensor will meet field commanders' needs in 2010 and beyond.

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Intelligence for the Coalition: The Story of Support to Coalition Task Force Kuwait

(Continued from page 6)

national components assisting in the defense of Kuwait. Overall, the personal relationships established among the intelligence staffs of the coalition partners will pay tremendous dividends in the face of future Iraqi provocation. Coalition Task Force-Kuwait CTF-K, supported by a strong joint and combined intelligence architecture, stands ready to accomplish its mission successfully, now and in the future.

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QUICK TIPS

The Challenge of Language Training

by First Lieutenant
Scott C. Hensley

With the ever-shrinking budgets and a tremendous operational tempo (OPTEMPO), language training is becoming more of a challenge to today's commanders, training officers, noncommissioned officers, and linguists. Soldiers traditionally maintain their foreign language capability by periodically attending a standard foreign language refresher course, usually for a period of two to four weeks. Although this is the preferred method, units sometimes cannot afford to let the soldiers go due to other requirements such as deployments, field exercises, or a personnel shortage. This creates several problems because these courses are usually only taught once or twice per year. Commanders must become creative with language training in their units.

First, units with linguists should have a scheduled amount of time per week devoted solely for language training. If your installation does not have a qualified native-speaking instructor at this allotted time, the most proficient soldier in the unit should be instructor-trained and act as the foreign language instructor. Commanders should block this time on the training schedule to eliminate other events or duties that might interfere with the instruction.

Second, use all the resources at your disposal. If your installation has video teletraining (VTT) capability, contact the Defense Language Institute (DLI) for a schedule of upcoming courses. This training provides student-instructor interaction for one to two hours per day, two to three days per week. This training is very structured and is more

cost-efficient than sending your soldier to another location to conduct language training. Use field training exercises as an opportunity to conduct foreign language training. If you are in a human intelligence (HUMINT) unit, tell your linguists to conduct their interrogations in the target language. Initially, they may feel uncomfortable, but they will become accustomed to the practice. Remember, "train as you fight", and your linguists will be conducting interrogations in the target language, not English. If you are in a signals intelligence (SIGINT) unit, send out teams to communicate over the net in the foreign language and tell the voice interceptors to intercept and gist the communications. Remember not to use classified information or specify a country name. Also emphasize that your soldiers use their target language as much as possible around the office; the more they use the language, the more comfortable and natural they will feel communicating with it.

Third—I feel this is the best and fastest way to achieve success in a foreign language—is total immersion). Two methods can accomplish this: actual deployment and foreign language training in the target country. There are several programs under which soldiers can travel to the target country, take part in foreign language classes taught by qualified native instructors, and take tours of the country. They also can have assignments requiring them to interact with people that do not speak English. Contact your unit or post Command Language Program Manager readiness training (REDTRAIN) or Total Army Language Program (TALP) manager for more information. The other method is ac-

tual deployment. If your unit is going to deploy overseas and does not have a linguist who speaks the required language, contact your supporting MI Battalion regarding linguist support. Interaction with native speakers can be very challenging in a nonclassroom environment, but it is also where you will find the best training. The linguists who deploy with you will be an invaluable tool in communicating with civilians whom you will meet.

The newest, ever-expanding means of individual and group language training is the Internet. There are countless sources on the Internet to improve foreign language skills. They include live radio broadcasts, foreign language newspapers, and educational foreign language sites that provide instruction in the foreign language from beginner to advanced.

This type of training allows the soldiers to conduct language training at home at the pace the linguists feel appropriate and in the areas they feel they need the help, whether in listening or reading. Units with computers and Internet access can also use Internet training as a part of their foreign language training program. Students can print out articles from newspapers or many other resources, and listen to foreign language broadcasts.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca language team developed and maintains the Soldier-Linguist Homepage that allows foreign language study in many languages including Korean, Arabic, Russian, Spanish, and Chinese. The address for our web page is <http://huachuca-usaic.Armymil/contlearning/ais/inex.htm>. For more information, contact Mr.

Pete Shaver or the author at 520-538-1042/1040 or DSN 879-1042/1040, or through our website (see previous page).

First Lieutenant Hensley is the Language Team Officer in Charge in the Directorate of Continuous Learning at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He previously served in the 163d MI Battalion in Fort Hood, Texas. 1LT

Hensley served as an enlisted soldier for four years as an Arabic Linguist before graduating from OCS. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in German from the University of Missouri.

PROPONENT NOTES

Enlisted. The overall percentage of fill for MI enlisted military occupational specialties (MOSs) remains a critical concern. Current Army operational strength, the fill priority average, and noncommissioned officer (NCO) shortages continue to produce low numbers in the force. The steps we have taken recently to increase recruiting, reduce academic attrition, and improve overall retention rates for MI soldiers should increase the total number of soldiers available.

Additionally, we will have a dramatic increase in enlisted promotions to Sergeant and Staff Sergeant beginning in February, and we expect the trend to continue at the senior NCO-level later this year. If we are able to "buy back" some of the NCOs we have lost in the latest Change in NCO Structure (CINCOS) review, we intend to look first at the tactical force. We strongly support demands for increased Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) seats to alleviate the backlog of promotable Specialists and their subsequent advancement to Sergeant. We will continue to work closely with field units, U.S. Total Army Recruiting Command, U.S. Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), and the Army Staff to improve the quantity and quality of our MI professional enlisted force.

Warrant Officer. In January, we submitted a military occupational classification and structure (MOCS) change requesting consolidation of warrant officer MOS 352D and

352H. The new MOS, 352H (Communications Interceptor/Locator Technician) derives from the enlisted MOSs, 98D (Emitter Locator/Identifier) and 98H (Communications Locator/Interceptor), which consolidated into MOS 98H last year. The consolidated MOS should take effect in October 1999. PERSCOM will monitor assignments within the new MOS to ensure the proper skills fill the correct position until the new accessions are trained in both areas.

Officer. To correct the shortage of company grade imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and counterintelligence officers in the MI Corps for the last few years, all captains graduating from the advanced course will complete a track course. As a result, the 304th MI Battalion increased training for these specialties in 1999. MI will produce more than double the number of graduates in these specialties than it did in 1998. In addition, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center is developing an "MI Officer Comprehensive Training Strategy" designed to improve officer training.

Work continues for the new functional area (FA) 34 (strategic intelligence) and the information operations career field. All field grade 35B (strategic intelligence) positions in the Active Component have been recoded to FA34. The 35B positions coded for captains have been recoded for 35D (all-source intelligence).

Force Structure. In December, as a precursor to the National Guard Bureau-sponsored G2/Commander's Conference held at Fort Huachuca, table of organization and equipment (TOE) analysts from all echelons met with National Guard unit representatives. The analysts reviewed each unit's latest Modified TOE (MTOE) line-by-line. Over the last several months, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) representatives and Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) TOE analysts have reviewed current TOEs with the objective of identifying obsolete equipment.

In addition, we have facilitated the submission of the proposed reorganization of the Technical Intelligence (TI) Battalion to the TRADOC Force Design Directorate as a part of the Force Design Update 98-2. This organizational redesign combines and reduces the size of the unit. The major portion of the TI capability will reside in the Reserve Component, while a small Active Component structure will allow for early deployment into a theater to begin the collection of foreign equipment and to establish the Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center.

Readers can contact OCMI via E-mail at ocmi@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or OCMI Web site: <http://huachuca-cd.army.mil/ocmi/index.html>

ASAS Master Analyst Program Sly Fox Den ASI 1F Notes

Using Commercial Applications to Improve Analytical Skills

by Frank Adams



The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Master Analyst Program (AMAP) introduced a new approach to refine order of battle (OB) and tactics training. One of the hardest things to do in the field is to sustain or improve the various analytical skills required by complex situations. With the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) so high and personnel strength a challenge, finding opportunities for this type of training are harder to find. The ASAS Master Analyst Course (AMAC) is continually looking for innovative ways to easily provide the "1F" graduates with the means and methods they can take back to their units for training.

Prior to the last two AMACs, the primary method used to help refine and improve soldiers' analytical skills was the "Sly Fox" crew exercise. With Class 98-003, AMAC explored another method—the integrated use of commercial conflict-simulation games to support our core training objectives. A tactical scenario using the 1991 battle of Khafji as a base allowed the students to "crawl" through the process of learning and using the three analytical techniques taught in the course:

- Pattern analysis to determine enemy composition and disposition.
- Comparative analysis to determine enemy OB and capabilities.
- Trend analysis to assess and predict enemy courses of action.

The students' initial reaction to the commercial conflict simulation was to focus on how they could destroy the enemy, without performing an adequate Intelligence Preparation at the Battlefield (IPB) or OB analysis. The students inconsistently evaluated the overall situation and performed little battle damage assessment—the key was to track the OB factors with an emphasis on composition and disposition. The situation realistically mimics

the narrow focus of an All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) workstation during operations. The development of intelligence and the needed tracking from the screen to posting to the situation map, SITMAP was slow. This intense exercise did lead to an evident improvement in performance during the later and larger "Sly Fox" crew exercise.

In addition to the commercial conflict-simulation exercise, Class 99-001 received practical analytical exercises that we added during each workstation block. These exercises showed how the specific workstation supports the analyst in the overall analytical effort. In addition, we used an extra scenario for the commercial exercise that prepared them for the difficult "Sly Fox" exercise. This simulation related to actual events that take place during the exercise. It showed the students what could happen if they did not identify the capabilities and tactics of the opposing force promptly and provide the information to the combat force. Important to the series of training events was developing a good understanding of both enemy and friendly tactics and capabilities. The additional scenario did improve the students' ability to detect key indicators for unit identification and mission determination more quickly than previous classes had.

This success demonstrates the advantages the use of commercial conflict games can bring in unit training. They can refresh, sustain, and improve analytical skills at all levels—enlisted, warrant officer, and officer.

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Master Sergeant Michael Fallon is the current Chief of the AMAP. For more information, contact AMAP via E-mail at amap@huachuca-emh1.army.mil, telephonically at (520) 533-4652 or DSN 821-4652, and through the AMAP web page at <http://138.27.202.66>.

How to Submit an Article to MIPB

Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. For example, it could discuss current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. It could be historical, explain lessons learned, or it could be an essay-type thought-provoking piece. It could be a short "quick tip" on better use of equipment or personnel, or fast "work-arounds" for problems. Articles from the "hot spots" are always welcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory, dispute an existing theory, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or explain how a new piece of new technology will change the way we operate.

Write an outline to organize your work and include a working title and headings. Plan to write 1000-2500 words (about 2-4 pages single-spaced text with normal margins, not counting graphics) and include graphics that enhance understanding of your topic. Quick tips should be 300-800 words. Put the "bottom line up front" and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders**, or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**.

In order to write a clearer, more forceful article, avoid several stylistic pitfalls.

- **Maintain the active voice as much as possible.** Write, "The soldier performed the task" rather than "The task was performed by the soldier."
- **Make your point.** Avoid writing about internal organization administration. If your topic is a new piece of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders describing the system, reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.
- **Use the fewest words to state your points.** Write "Leaders must emphasize training" rather than "It is imperative for MI professional leaders to refocus their attention to training issues."

Please send the article via E-mail to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil with courtesy copy to mcgovern@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or mail it (with a soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CLM (MIPB), [FedEx/Priority Mail: Bldg 61730, Room 127], Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use special document templates and do attach the graphics separately. We can accept articles in Microsoft Office 97®, Word 6.0™, Word Perfect 6.0a™, and ASCII and PowerPoint™ or Corel®.) Please include with your article:

- A cover letter with your work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published. Please include your social security number (SSN) so that we can find you if you transfer, PCS, or ETS/retire before we publish your article; we will protect your SSN and make no other use of it. Also, indicate whether we may put your article on our Internet web site even if we do not publish it in the printed magazine.
- Pictures, graphics, and crests/logos with adequate descriptions. Try to find good "action" photos that illustrate your article; photos and other graphics really enliven an article. We need complete captions for the photos (the who, what, where, when, why, and how; the photographer credits; and include the author's name on photos). We can return photos if so requested—be sure to include an address to which you want the photos sent after we use them. We will gladly accept photos without articles too.
- A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article is "unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain." (MIPB is available for sale by the Government Printing Office and posted on the Internet.)
- The full name of each author in the byline and a biography for each. The biography should include the authors' current duty positions, other related assignments, civilian degrees (degree, school, major), and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSI, SEIP, and PGIP). (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. We will send you an acknowledgment that we received your article. We may notify you again when we get ready to run it. Please inform us of your current E-mail, telephone numbers, and postal addresses if you change jobs, move, or PCS. It can take a year or more before we run some articles.

302d Military Intelligence Battalion

The colors on the fox's mask and background represent the battalion's war service as a signal unit. The censor's stamp on the fox's mask indicates the intelligence function. The key is for the first battle honor, Normandy, of World War II and also alludes to the former signal and current intelligence function of the battalion. The lightning flashes symbolize radio reconnaissance.

The 302d Military Intelligence Battalion evolved from the 325th Signal Service Company activated on 1 April 1944 in England. After service in England, France, and Germany during World War II, the company returned to the United States and the War Department inactivated the battalion on 24 November 1945. The company reactivated as the 533d Signal Service Company in Salzburg, Austria, and on 13 October 1950 became the 302d Communication Reconnaissance Battalion assigned to Camp Pickett, Virginia.



From 1952 to 1994, the battalion underwent a series of moves and organizational changes, with headquarters at Heilbronn (1952), Bamberg (1955), Herzogenaurach (1956), and Frankfurt (1975). On 16 April 1984, the battalion became the 302d MI Battalion (Corps). The 302d currently serves as the corps intelligence battalion for V Corps with its headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany. The battalion's awards include battle streamers for campaigns in Ardennes-Alsace, Central Europe, Rhineland, Normandy, and Saudi Arabia. In 1997, the battalion earned the Army Superior Unit Award.

Today the 302d MI Battalion provides all-source intelligence collection management, analysis, production, and dissemination in support of V Corps conventional and stability operations. The battalion organizes and deploys tailored intelligence packages in support of V Corps operational requirements. Currently, they deploy personnel and support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Turkey to name only a few.

Loyalty, Vigilance, Pride!

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